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Abstract
The current and future energy situations in Canada are put into perspective, and the
importance of nuclear energy and controversies surrounding it are investigated. More
specifically, to demonstrate the important role nuclear energy has to play in Canada’s
future, a novel energy modeling tool, Canadian Energy Systems Simulator (CanESS), is
employed. CanESS is a modeling platform with a huge database that assists an analyst
in defining different energy scenarios by modifying the variables such as population and
contributions of different energy sources to the overall production. The CanESS results
clearly show that expansion of nuclear energy production is required to meet energy demand
and simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
To formally study strategic issues connected to the ongoing conflict over nuclear power
production in Ontario, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is utilized. This
flexible systems methodology is used to study the nuclear disputes that existed in Ontario
at two key points in time: the fall of 2008 and spring of 2010. The results of the 2008
analysis, especially the sensitivity analyses, show that the only decision makers (DMs)
involved in the conflict who hold real power are the Federal and Ontario governments,
although at the beginning of the investigation the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL)
and the environmental groups had also been considered as participating DMs. The findings
and information of the analysis in 2008, as well as an updated background for 2010, are
used to perform another analysis in 2010. According to the results of the 2008 analysis,
only the two governments are considered as the DMs in 2010. Meanwhile, their options or
possible courses of action have also been changed. Again, at this stage the stable states of
the game are found, and attitude analysis is carried out to obtain deeper insights about
the dispute. The equilibria or potential resolutions of the 2008 analysis are found to be
the transition states in the 2010 analysis. Specifically, it is discovered that if the Federal
Government does have a negative attitude towards the Ontario Government, it is possible
that the final outcome is a state that is among the least preferred states for both DMs.
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Canada is a huge country with vast amounts of energy resources. Oil, gas, water power, and
nuclear energy are the largest energy sources. Each Canadian province follows a specific
electricity generation policy. For example, hydroelectricity is the most important source in
Quebec, while in Ontario, nuclear energy plays a major role in electricity production. In
this research, the effort is to provide an overall picture of the energy situation in Canada.
Along with literature review, by using the software developed by the “Whatif? Technolo-
gies” company, Canadian Energy Systems Simulator (CanESS), the user is able to attain
both a quantitative and qualitative understanding of the energy situation in Canada. Nu-
clear energy is found to be a very important source of energy in Canada. Investing on
nuclear industry seems to be vital to have a bright energy future. With regard to nu-
clear energy, a very important conflict is going on in Ontario. Using the Graph Model for
Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993) makes it possible to investigate the On-
tario nuclear energy dispute, which is an ongoing conflict between the Federal and Ontario
governments.
1.1 Motivation
The goal of this work is to provide an overview on the energy situation in the country,
with a special emphasis on nuclear energy in Ontario. Nowadays, energy is playing a
significant role in people’s lives. Considering the growing population and, consequently,
energy demand, one may observe that the issue of energy production is becoming more
challenging. The limitations of fossil fuels and their environmental impacts forces nations
to be more focused on developing environmentally friendly methods of energy production.
This study investigates the situation of energy and electricity generated by renewable
sources, such as water, wind, bioenergy, solar, and geothermal, and non-renewable sources,
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such as coal, natural gas, oil, and nuclear. The aforementioned CanESS software and its
associated data time-series are very helpful tools to improve the research.
Since the focus is on the energy situation in Ontario, by using CanESS, some simulations
are performed to investigate this province in more detail. The data shows that, in Ontario,
natural gas and nuclear energy will be the main sources in future. Nuclear energy is
very important for Canada - it is a clean and almost unlimited source. On the other
hand, natural gas is a fossil fuel, limited, and causes adverse environmental impacts. In
addition, Canada has been one of the world’s pioneers in nuclear technology since the
technology of the atomic bomb was first developed. Regarding nuclear energy, Ontario is
the most important province in the country. The Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL)
is located in Ontario and is responsible for the country’s exclusive CANDU design, and
the maintenance of CANDU reactors in the country and those built around the world.
However, there has been a conflict between the Federal and Ontario governments in the
past couple of years. The Ontario Government intends to expand the Darlington nuclear
site, and plans to procure its reactors from AECL. Meanwhile, the Federal Government an-
nounced the decision of restructuring and selling or privatizing AECL. Nuclear technology
has been very important to Canada since its genesis. Huge investments have been made
in this industry. If AECL is sold and the Ontario Government does not buy its reactors
from this company, it is very possible that no other province will make any purchases
from AECL in the future. Accordingly, another key purpose of this research is to model
this conflict by using the GMCR method. This approach realistically models the conflict
between two or more players with multiple alternative options.
This academic work is helpful to researchers who would like to have an understanding
of the energy situation in Canada. Moreover, since the analyzed conflict is still an ongoing
dispute in the country, this study is instructive to the decision makers and parties involved
in the game.
1.2 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is composed of six chapters as depicted in Figure 1.1. Chapter 2 studies the
situation of different sources of energy in the country. This chapter provides very useful
information about the contribution of each source in the country’s energy production and
use. In addition, in some cases, the advantages and disadvantages and related projects
are discussed. This chapter puts energy situation into perspective. Furtheremore, since in
Chapter 5 the nuclear energy conflict of Ontario is discussed, Ontario’s energy perspective
is also provided in Section 2.3. In addition, in Section 2.4 (Summary) the view of the
Canadian Academy of Engineering (CAE) is explored. CAE had done the most in-depth
analysis with regard to the energy issue in the country. In Chapter 3, the CanESS software
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is introduced, and some examples are provided to explain how it works. Then several simu-
lations are performed. In this chapter, the significance of nuclear energy is well understood.
Chapter 4 talks about the history of nuclear energy and the role of Canada in this regard.
Since in the following chapter, the concentration is on nuclear energy, Chapter 4 provides
a historical background about this source of energy in the country. The insights provided
in Chapter 4 is important for the strategic study that is done in Chapter 5. In Chapters
2, 3, and 4, it is explained how nuclear energy is important to Canada. In Chapter 5, the
conflict between the Federal and provincial governments is examined. The attempt is to
model the dispute with GMCR methodology and its associated software, GMCR II. In this
chapter, the methodology is explained, and the components of the model are described.
Finally, in the final chapter, Chapter 6, the conclusions and further thoughts and future
directions are provided.
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Chapter 2
Energy Situation in Canada
The key goal of this chapter is to provide an overall perspective about the energy situation
in Canada. The matter of energy is important to Canada which has an enormous potential
for the development of different energy sources. In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the situation of
renewable (water, wind, bioenergy, solar, and geothermal) and nonrenewable (coal, natural
gas, oil, and nuclear) energy sources in the country are explored, respectively. Their
contribution in energy and electricity production, including advantages and limitations are
also discussed.
In Section 2.3, Ontario’s energy situation is reviewed. Since nuclear energy conflicts in
Ontario are analyzed in Chapter 5, knowing about the “big picture” of the energy situation
in Ontario provides relevant background material about Chapter 5.
Finally, the view of the Canadian Academy of Engineering (CAE) is explored in Section
2.4 (Summary). CAE has carried out a comprehensive energy study of a rich variety of
energy “pathways” for meeting energy demand in Canada, and its work provides a very
bright view of the energy situation in the country. CAE has also published a valuable
report (Bowman and Griesbach, 2007) exploring short-term and long-term aspects of energy
production in the country.
2.1 Renewable Energy Sources
Renewable sources of energy consist of water, wind, bioenergy, solar, and geothermal.
These types of energy do not increase carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, and, unlike
non-renewable sources such as coal, are renewable. Large hydro plants, being considered
renewable, account for about 60% of the Canada’s electricity production. Electricity rep-
resents about 20% of Canada’s energy usage, so water provides about 12% of Canadian
5
energy, and is the only considerable renewable energy source since, according to 2008 statis-
tics, the other renewable energy sources account for only 0.5% of electricity production. A
major energy goal in Canada is to improve renewable energy production in the country,
and huge investments are in place (Environment Canada, 2010).
2.1.1 Water
Statistical Information
Canada has a huge amount of water resources and is the third country in the world in
terms of fresh water resources. It is the world’s second largest producer of hydroelectricity
after China and provides about 13% of the world’s supply. Quebec, British Columbia
(BC), Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), Ontario, and Manitoba are the largest producers
of hydroelectricity in the country (International Energy Agency, 2008a; Government of
Canada, 2009). Figure 2.1 shows the electricity production in each province in 2008.
Figure 2.1: Electricity production in each province in 2008 (Canadian Electricity Associa-
tion, 2008)
Hydroelectricity accounts for about 60% of the electricity produced in Canada. Fig-
ure 2.2 is obtained from the 2009 International Energy Agency report, and shows the
amount of electricity produced by hydro power in Canada in comparison to other sources.
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Figure 2.2: Electricity produced by different sources in Canada (International Energy
Agency, 2009)
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Hydroelectricity Advantages and Disadvantages
Hydroelectric facilities, like any other energy source, have their own advantages and dis-
advantages. The advantages are as follows:
 Hydroelectricity generation does not produce carbon dioxide. Some GreenHouse Gas
(GHG) emissions do occur, but hydro plants release 60 and 30 times less GHG than
coal-fired and natural gas power plants, respectively (Lathem, 2010).
 The technology is efficient; modern technologies can convert 95% of the energy in
a river’s flow to electricity, while the most efficient fossil fuel plants are about 60%
efficient (Canadian Hydropower Association, 2008).
 Hydroelectricity production is an ideal backup for high demand periods and intermit-
tent wind electricity generation. During increased electricity demand, a hydro plant
can almost instantly respond by increasing the flow of water through its turbines.
Nevertheless, the process of starting up a nuclear reactor and a coal-fired plant take
about 24 and 12 hours, respectively (Canadian Hydropower Association, 2008).
 Few breakdowns happen in these plants, and they have a long service life; DeCew
Falls in Ontario, Pointe de Bois in Manitoba, and Beauharnois in Quebec have been
operating for 112, 99, and 75 years, respectively. In addition, the maintenance costs
are low (Canadian Hydropower Association, 2008).
 Unlike fossil fuel energy, hydro power is produced through a short energy chain, so
this energy can be more reasonably considered “renewable.”
 Hydroelectricity is a domestic resource, meaning that its pricing is independent of
other fuel price. For example, BC and Quebec have relatively low electricity rates in
North America (Natural Resources Canada, 2009a; Canadian Hydropower Associa-
tion, 2008).
The disadvantages are listed below:
 Methane is emitted due to vegetation decomposition in flooded areas. Studies show
that the amount of methane emitted from reservoirs is considerable and contributes
to air pollution. Although dams are less polluting than non-renewable resources,
dam reservoirs account for over 4% of the total global warming impact of human
activities (Lima et al., 2008; International Hydropower Association, 2010).
 Fish habitat is damaged by the bacteria in decaying vegetation which converts mer-
cury in rocks to a soluble form (Centre for Energy, 2010).
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 Hydro-power developments across boreal regions, especially if they contain logging,
cause major assaults on boreal forests. Boreal forests are sources of carbon storage
and water filtration. They are home to migratory songbirds and shorebirds, large
populations of bears, wolves, and lynx, and native fish. In addition, Aboriginal
communities depend on the region’s ecosystems and wildlife for their livelihood and
way of life (Schindler et al., 2010).
 To use the flow of rivers for hydroelectricity generation, a significant portion of the
river flow must be diverted to that of another river or to a penstock, a pipe that brings
water from the river to power turbines located at a lower elevation (Figure 2.3). This
diversion leads to negative environmental impacts such as aquatic habitat quality
reduction (Watershed Watch Salmon Society Coquitlam, British Columbia, 2007).
For example, in the James Bay Project, the flow of Quebec’s Eastmain River was
reduced by 90% at its mouth and diverted north to the La Grande River (The Global
Oneness Commitment, 2010).
Figure 2.3: A typical hydro project that uses the river’s flow (Watershed Watch Salmon
Society Coquitlam, British Columbia, 2007)
Regulations
Hydro-power accounts for 97% of Canada’s renewable electricity generation; the other 3%
is comprised of biomass, wind, geothermal and solar power. Although hydro energy seems
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to be a renewable resource, not all hydro electricity projects are considered clean and
environmentally acceptable. According to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act,
1999 (CEPA 1999), the legislation governing the building of any new project requires the
participation of all stakeholders. Environment Canada’s website explains this act as “An
Act respecting pollution prevention and the protection of the environment and human
health in order to contribute to sustainable development.” CEPA 1999 became operative
on March 31, 2000, and has been updated since then (Government of Canada, 1999).
One of the most challenging parts to building large hydro facilities is dealing with
the people who are residents in the area of the potential facility. The construction of
hydro plants in the north and west of Canada has already affected the lifestyle of local
Native people. Although hydro plants may bring job opportunities to nearby communities,
they can restrict farming and hunting, and affect the residents’ lifestyles and the natural
environment. The advantages and disadvantages of hydro plants (discussed in Section 2.1.1,
page 8) are well known, and therefore, communications and meetings with all involved
people are necessary when new plants are proposed.
The definition of “renewable energy” can be different according to political jurisdictions.
For example, in the US state of California, if the electricity is derived from hydroelectric
plants of 30 MW or less, and if the project does not require the construction of a new dam, it
is considered renewable. Under the state of Vermont law, only hydro electric projects under
200 MW were previously eligible for renewable status. However, this law has been changed
due to a recent energy contract between Hydro-Quebec and Vermont (Lathem, 2010). The
current situation of Vermont law is explained in Section 2.1.1, page 11. Hydroelectricity
produced through pumped storage technology does not qualify as being renewable in the
state of Maryland. However, as mentioned, in Canada, if all the groups involved in a hydro
project are satisfied with the conditions, and if the environmental and health assessments
are passed, then the hydropower obtained from that project is considered to be renewable.
Small Hydro
In addition to large hydro plants, small hydro facilities play a role in electricity generation.
In Canada, the term ”small hydro” refers to hydroelectric projects with between 1 and 50
megawatts (MW) in installed capacity. The electricity generated in small hydro projects
can be transferred to the grid or used for independent, local, and stand-alone applications
in isolated remote areas. Canada’s installed small hydro capacity was 3,400 MW in 2009,
and the potential capacity is estimated to be 15,000 MW.
Aside from the amount of electricity generation, the major difference between small
and large hydro facilities is the environmental impact and GHG emissions. Small hydro
uses little or no reservoir storage since most such projects use ”run-of-river” technology,
thereby mitigating the effects on the environment (Natural Resources Canada, 2009f).
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Hydro Projects
To clarify the current and the potential hydroelectricity production in the country, the
author has used the data provided in CanESS software to obtain Figure 2.4. CanESS
software and the way it works are explained in Chapter 3. Future year data are obtained
by executing trend analysis in the software. As shown in Figure 2.4, there is the possibility
to double the existing hydro capacity by increasing the load factor of the facilities. However,
technology issues are a problem in tis regard. The common hydro plants technologies are
explained in Appendix A.






















Figure 2.4: Used and potential hydroelectricity capacity, and the required electricity. Ob-
tained using CanESS in Chapter 3
Some of the ongoing hydro projects are listed below:
 Construction of the Ontario-Quebec Interconnection Line: This project in-
volves the establishment of a 1250 MW transmission line between the two provinces.
It started in 2006, and will be completed in 2010. The first phase, the commissioning
of the 230 KV line, switching section, and the first convertor, was finished in 2009,
and the second phase will end in 2010 (Hydro-Quebec, 2009).
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 James Bay Project, Construction of Two New Generating Stations: The
James Bay Project is the largest hydroelectricity project in the country and is located
in Quebec. The eight operating stations now produce about 16,000 MW of electricity.
Another two stations are under construction. The construction is being performed
by Hydro-Quebec. The two stations, Eastmain 1-A and Sarcelle, produce 3.4 TWh
per year. The construction of the new stations started in 2007 and is scheduled
to finish by 2012 (Hydro-Quebec, 2008). The ten generating stations are listed as
follows (James Bay Road, 2010):
– La Grande 1
– Robert-Bourassa, La Grande 2-A
– La Grande 3





– Eastmain 1-A (under construction)
– Sarcelle (under construction)
 Niagara Tunnel Project: The tunnel is located under the city of Niagara Falls.
The project is designed to divert water from the Niagara River and carry it down-
stream to the Sir Adam Beck Generating Stations (10.2 km distance and 14.4 m
wide). The project was initiated in 2009 and will be completed in 2012 or 2013 (On-
tario Power Generation, 2010).
 Wuskwatim Generation Project: The project involves the development of a 200
MW generating station at Taskinigup Falls on the Burntwood River by an equity
partnership between the Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation (NCN) and Manitoba Hydro,
called the Wuskwatim Power Limited Partnership. It is scheduled for completion in
2011 (Manitoba Hydro, 2010).
 Romaine Complex 1500 MW Project: The station is located on the lower North
Shore of the St. Lawrence River, north of the municipality of Havre-Saint-Pierre in
Quebec, and Hydro-Quebec is executing the project. The project was commenced
in mid 2009. The first Romaine commissioning is planned for 2014, and it will com-
pleted in 2020. Hydro-Quebec Production has obtained the necessary approvals to
build it. The complex will consist of four hydropower generating stations with a
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Guide to abbreviations and French names
EMN  . . . . . . . (Environmental Monitoring Network)
EOL  . . . . . . . . (Eastmain Opinaca La Grande)
Fondation de la faune du Québec – Québec Wildlife Foundation
FQF  . . . . . . . . (Fédération québécoise de la faune) – Québec Wildlife Federation
FQSA  . . . . . . . (Fédération québécoise pour le saumon atlantique) – Québec Atlantic 
Salmon Federation 
GECCK  . . . . . (Groupe d’étude conjoint Caniapiscau-Koksoak) – Caniapiscau-Koksoak 
Joint Study Group
GHG  . . . . . . . (greenhouse gas)
ISP  . . . . . . . . . (Income Security Program)
JBNQA . . . . . . (James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement)
Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec – Québec Department of Cultural Affairs
Ministère de l’Environnement – Department of Environment (which replaced the Ministère de
l’Environnement et de la Faune – Québec Department of Environment and Wildlife)
Ministère du Loisir, de la Chasse et de la Pêche – Québec Department of Recreation, Fish and Game
Ministère des Richesses naturelles du Québec – Québec Department of Natural Resources
NBR . . . . . . . . (Nottaway Broadback Rupert)
NQA  . . . . . . . (Northeastern Québec Agreement)
NSERC . . . . . . (Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada)
SDBJ  . . . . . . . (Société de développement de la Baie James) – James Bay Development Corporation
SEBJ  . . . . . . . . (Société d’énergie de la Baie James) – James Bay Energy Corporation
SOTRAC  . . . . (Société des travaux de correction) – Remedial Measures Corporation
Units of Measure
$M  . . . . . . . . . millions of dollars (in Canadian funds, unless otherwise indicated)
MW  . . . . . . . . megawatt (one million watts)
GW  . . . . . . . . gigawatt (one million kilowatts)
GWh  . . . . . . . gigawatthour (one million kilowatthours)
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1 kg  . . . . . . . . = 2.2 lb
1 g  . . . . . . . . . = 0.035 oz.
1 cm . . . . . . . . = 0.39 in.
1 m . . . . . . . . . = 3.28 ft.
1 m2  . . . . . . . . = 10.76 sq. ft.
1 km  . . . . . . . = 0.62 mi.
1 km2  . . . . . . . = 0.39 sq. mi.
1 m3  . . . . . . . . = 35.31 cu. ft.
1 ha  . . . . . . . . = 2.47 acres
Figure 2.5: James Bay Project map (Hydro-Quebec, 2005)
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total annual output of eight terawatt hours (TWh). Hydro-Quebec is following the
government’s guidelines to minimize environmental damage. The Romaine is one of
the last free flowing Atlantic salmon rivers on the north shore of the St. Lawrence.
Hydro-Quebec’s environmental plans include protecting down river in-stream flows
to preserve fish habitats, creating spawning areas, building nesting platforms, devel-
oping wetlands and borrow pits, and creating bays to facilitate riparian habitats. It
has a plan to spend $20 million on an Atlantic salmon development program over 20
years (Hydro-Quebec, 2004).
In addition to current hydro projects, there are also projects that will possibly be
executed in the future. Some of them are listed as follows:
 New Power Deal Between Hydro-Quebec and Vermont: With this power
supply contract, about 225 MW of Quebec’s electricity will be sold to Vermont be-
tween 2012 and 2038. Currently, Vermont gets about one-third of its power from
Hydro-Quebec. As mentioned above, under previous Vermont law, only hydroelec-
tric projects under 200 Megawatts (MW) were eligible for renewable status, but the
Vermont legislature changed the law, so that the electricity from Quebec’s massive
dams are considered “renewable” (Lathem, 2010). Vermont is the first state in the
US that to declare large hydroelectric power as a renewable energy resource (CBC,
2010). The deal was signed in August 2010, but must still be reviewed by the state’s
Public Service Board (Hydro World, 2010).
 Site ”C” Generating Station in British Columbia: A significant potential
hydro site remains in British Columbia and is located in the northeast on the Peace
River. It will provide approximately 900 MW or 4,600 GWh per year. Site C has
now advanced to the regulatory review phase, which takes about two years. It is
anticipated that this site will be available for supplying domestic electricity needs by
2020 (BC Hydro, 2010).
 Lower Churchill Falls Generating Station: Lower Churchill Falls is located
in Labrador. There is a potential to construct two hydroelectricity stations on the
Lower Churchill River.
The Project consists of two sub-projects: Generation and Transmission. Nalcor, an
energy-development company in New Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), has pro-
posed two locations for the Generation sub-project, Gull Island and Muskrat Falls,
shown in Figure 2.6. The two stations will have a combined capacity of 3,074 MW
and can provide 16.7 TWh of electricity per year. The start date of the project
depends on the Environmental Assessment process (Nalcor, 2010).
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Figure 2.6: Churchill Falls (Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, 2006)
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 Building the Power Line from Labrador to the New Brunswick Grid: This
project is related to an old controversial hydroelectricity contract in Canada, which
will be discussed in the next section. The overall plan is to build a transmission line
in order to transmit the electricity produced in Labrador to other provinces in the
country.
Churchill Falls Contract
The controversy over the Churchill Falls contract is due to the geographical location of
the province of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL). The only province with which NL has
land borders is Quebec. Churchill Falls station has an installed capacity of 5,428 MW
and generates 35 TWh per year. The majority of the electricity produced is being sold
to Hydro-Quebec through a long-term power purchase contract, which was signed in 1969
and is set to expire in 2041.
According to the contract, Quebec is purchasing the electricity at a low price. In 1976,
it paid 3 mills, or 3 tenths of a cent, per kilowatt hour. In 1996, it paid 2.7 mills, or just over
one quarter of a cent. By 2016, the price will drop to 2 mills, or one fifth of a cent. Quebec
sells this electricity at a much higher price to the USA and domestic consumers. “[In 2009],
Hydro-Quebec earned about $1.7 billion from the contract..., compared with about $63
million collected by [NL],” said NL Premier Danny Williams (CBC News, 2009b). “[NL]
was under huge pressure when it was signing the Churchill Falls contract with Quebec in
1969,” stated Brian Tobin, Premier of NL in 1996. By 1969, the Churchill Falls Company
had spent $150 million on the construction, but had not signed a power contract. The
Vice President of the Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation (CF(L) Co), Eric Lambert,
said in 1967 that if the deal with Hydro Quebec fell through, it would “bankrupt Churchill
Falls and imperil Brinco” (CF(L)Co’s parent company). “Hydro-Quebec knew this and
exploited it,” said Brian Tobin (Newfoundland and Labrador Government Website, 1996).
Quebec has not been allowing NL to transfer electricity through Quebec’s electricity
grid or to build its own power line across Quebec. Therefore, NL can only sell its electricity
to Quebec. NL has requested revision of the contract several times. It has also repeatedly
complained that Hydro-Quebec is not allowing fair and open access to its transmission
lines. However, NL has not obtained any changes. The last time Quebec denied NL’s
request was in May 2010 (CBC News, 2010b).
The challenge between Quebec and NL might not be unrelated to the history of the
political dispute between the two provinces. The timelines of the conflict are as follows (The
Writers’ Alliance of Newfoundland and Labrador and Cabot College Literacy Office, 1996):
 In 1774, the Quebec Act gives control of Labrador to Canada, making it part of
Quebec.
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 In 1809, Labrador is re-annexed from Quebec and restored to Newfoundland.
 In 1902, Quebec and Newfoundland begin to dispute the boundary of Labrador again.
 In March 1927, the present-day boundary of Labrador is established by a British
committee.
The conflict was not resolved by the 1927 decision: in 2001, the Quebec Natural Re-
sources Minister and Quebec Intergovernmental Affairs Minister reasserted that Quebec
has never recognized the 1927 border: “The ministers reiterate that no Quebec government
has ever formally recognized the drawing of the border between Quebec and Newfoundland
in the Labrador peninsula according to the opinion rendered by the privy council in 1927.
For Quebec, this border has thus never been definitively defined” (The Secrétariat aux
affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes, 2001).
NL does not want to allow the same thing to happen with the Lower Churchill Falls
project. Officials are searching different options and technologies to transmit the electricity
to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick’s power grid. However, the price of building undersea
power lines is very high, and such challenges have made the progress of the project very
slow. The plan was for the first power from Lower Churchill Falls to be drawn as early as
2015. Constructing such a power line between NL and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
needs the cooperation of all three provinces (CBC News, 2010a). To recognize the impor-
tance of the electricity produced in this station, the reduction in GHG emissions by a third
station entering the grid is examined in Section 3.2.1.
2.1.2 Wind
Canada has considerable wind energy capacity and is the 11th country in the world in
wind energy production (World Wind Energy Association, 2009). Currently, wind farms
in Canada produce 3,472 MW electricity, which accounts for 1.1% of the country’s elec-
tricity demand. The most wind energy is generated by Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta.
In 2009, a record year for wind energy, 950 MW capacity was installed (Canadian Wind
Energy Association, 2009b). Figure 2.7 shows the development of wind energy capacity
in the country. A huge potential STILL exists; according to the Canadian Wind En-
ergy Association’s ”Wind Vision 2025” report, by 2025, Canada can get 20 percent of its
electricity–55,000 MW–from wind, by constructing 22,000 wind turbines spread over about
450 locations across Canada (Canadian Wind Energy Association, 2009a).
Wind energy is a clean and renewable source; it causes reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions and air contaminants. For example, an installation of six 65 KW wind turbines
in Newfoundland is expected to produce approximately 1 million KWh of electricity a
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Figure 2.7: The development of wind energy capacity installation (Canadian Wind Energy
Association, 2009a)
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year and reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 750 tonnes (Natural Resources Canada,
2009g). The main disadvantage of this source of energy is that wind is intermittent, but
offshore wind is a more reliable source of renewable energy. Unlike onshore wind, which can
be intermittent and inefficient, offshore wind is consistent and significantly more powerful.
However, Canada has as of yet no installed offshore wind facilities.
Strategies in Wind Development
Countries use economic incentives and political legislation to support the idea of wind
facility development. For example, in 2006, Ontario Premier, Dalton McGuinty, intro-
duced the Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program. This act supports the renewable
projects in Ontario that produce no more than 10 MW (Ontario Power Authority, 2006).
In September 2009, the Ontario Government said it would spend $2.3 billion over the next
three years to expand and upgrade its power transmission network. As wind farms are
far from residential areas, this investment would reinforce wind energy development. “En-
hancing our transmission grid is critical to taking advantage of green energy,” said George
Smitherman, Ontario’s Minister of Energy and Infrastructure (Calgary Herald, 2009).
The incentive policies were effective; although Canada is still not among the top ten
wind energy providers in the world, in it was the eighth participating country in wind
capacity development in the world and produced 2.3% of total new wind electricity pro-
duction in the world (Figure 2.8).
Another important legislation was the Green Energy and Green Economy Act that was
passed by Ontario legislators in May 2009. The act has two main goals: to make it easier to
bring renewable energy online, and to support the culture of conservation (Green Energy
Act Alliance, 2009).
Wind Energy Projects and Organizations
In order to develop more wind farms, many wind projects have been proposed in the
country. Some of them are listed below:
 Knob Hill Wind Farm: This 150 MW project is located on the Knob Hill Plateau
on the northern tip of Vancouver Island. The project consists of 66 wind turbines.
The input of First Nations and stakeholders was obtained by Sea Breeze, the com-
pany in charge of the project. Its staff helped identify the potential impact of the
project on local environments. However, the project must first be approved by the
Environmental Assessment Office of British Columbia. The construction schedule is
dependent on power purchase contracts (Sea Breeze Power Co., 2009).
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Figure 2.8: Countries’ share of new wind energy capacity in 2009 (World Wind Energy
Association, 2009)
 Greenwich Wind Farm: The site is located in northeast Thunder Bay, Ontario and
will generate approximately 100 MW of electricity. Construction is now underway,
and the project will be built over 18 months and should be finished by the beginning
of 2012. Renewable Energy Systems Canada Inc. (RES Canada) is in charge of
the project. In order to promote a better relationship with First Nations, the local
community, and the environment, RES Canada sponsored 2010’s Dorion Country
Canyon Birding Festival for the second consecutive year (Renewable Energy Systems
Canada Inc., 2009).
 Small-Scale Wind Projects in Quebec: In April 2009, Hydro-Quebec called
for small-scale wind proposals, and on the July 6 bid deadline, Hydro-Quebec had
received 31 community wind proposals totaling 732 MW and 13 First Nations bids
totaling 319 MW. The utility will evaluate the proposals and expects to announce
the winners near the end of 2010 (Balley, 2010).
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 Trillium Power Wind1: This facility will be located 17 to 28 km off the shores of
northeastern Lake Ontario and will deliver approximately 420 MW. Trillium Power
Wind Corporation is working on this project, which is under environmental assess-
ment. The first commissioning is planned for August 2013, and the turbines should
operate for 20 years. The time line is subject to change if the notice to proceed from
the Ontario Power Authority is not acquired by June 2011 (Trillium Power Wind,
2010).
Challenges
Although Canada made a great improvement in installing new wind capacity in 2009,
some organizations such as Blue Green Canada believe that the country is far behind
where should be. Blue Green Canada, an alliance between the United Steelworkers and
Environmental Defence, published a report in May 2010, discussing clean energy invest-
ments made by Canada’s federal Government and by US President Obama. The Canadian
government emphasized that it is matching its energy and climate policies with those of the
United States. The report looks at support for renewable energy, greener transportation
and energy efficiency (Environmental Defense, 2010). Key findings include:
 If Canada matched the US, Cdn $11.5 billion would have been invested in clean
energy.
 Compared to the US, Mexico, Australia, China and South Korea, Canada dedicated
less of its stimulus budget to clean energy.
 If Canada’s investment matched US investment in renewable energy, approximately,
an additional 66,000 jobs would have been created.
2.1.3 Bioenergy
Bioenergy is the energy derived by the conversion of biomass, recently living organisms,
animals or plants, or their metabolic byproducts. Wood, corn, sugar cane, and cow ma-
nure are examples of biomass. Biofuels are fuels such as bio-diesel and ethanol that are
derived from biomass. Bioenergy is the second largest source of renewable energy after
hydroelectricity. British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and New Brunswick are the
pioneer provinces in bioenergy production (Bradley, 2006).
Technologies available to convert biomass are (Natural Resources Canada, 2008b):
 Gasification: converts forestry, agricultural and municipal residues into gas.
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 Combustion: converts forestry, agricultural and municipal residues into heat and
power.
 Thermal and catalytic processing: convert vegetable oils, waste greases and animal
fats into renewable diesel fuels.
 Pyrolysis: converts forestry, agricultural and municipal residues into bio-oils.
 Fermentation: converts the starch and cellulose components of biomass to bio-ethanol.
 Anaerobic digestion: converts manures, food processing and municipal wastes into
methane-rich biogas.
Unlike other natural resources such as petroleum, coal and nuclear fuels, bioenergy is a
renewable energy source. The combustion of biomass, like other fuels, generates pollution
as a by-product. However, the carbon in biofuels is extracted from atmospheric carbon
dioxide by growing plants, so the combustion of a biofuel does not result in a net increase
of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere. The main advantage of using bioenergy in
electricity and heat production is the amount of GHG emissions. In general, the GHG
emissions of bioenergy systems are lower compared to fossil fuel systems (Jungmeier and
Spitzer, 2004).
Opportunities and Challenges
Canada is a heavily forested nation, accounting for 10 percent of the world’s forests. The
BIOCAP Canada Foundation published a report in 2004, estimating that there might be
enough unused biomass from Canada’s forestry and farming to provide almost 27 percent
of the country’s energy needs (BIOCAP Canada and Pollution Probe, 2004). However, the
gathering and processing of this widely distributed resource is not currently feasible. Some
challenges have to be overcome in order to take full advantage of this source.
Some barriers and challenges are discussed in the published reports by the Canadian
Bioenergy Association, Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, and Natural Resources
Canada- Canadian Wood Fibre Center. They are listed below:
 Canada has huge fossil fuel resources. Significant investments are assigned to their
development, so that the price of fossil fuels will be very low. The low price of coal,
gas, and oil inhibits investor enthusiasm for bioenergy technology development and
trade. With regards to the pricing issue, another problem is high plant construction
expenses. For example, the capital cost of building a bioenergy plant ranges between
$1,500 to $2,500 per KW, while that of a coal plant ranges from $1,500 to $2,000 per
KW (Institute for Energy Research, 2009).
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 The logistical situation is another barrier to bioenergy development. Although
Canada has vast resources of biomass, many of them are located in hard-to-access
areas, far from residential locations, and too spread out to be economical to collect
and use (Bradley, 2009).
 Undeveloped supply chains is another issue. Canada does not have low-cost supply
chains established for forest harvest biomass projects. It will take a major effort
by Nordic and Canadian Associations, companies and governments to transfer tech-
nology and learning to Canadian forests. Arrangements for technology transfer and
trade missions are in process (Bradley, 2009).
 The pressure to keep biomass as a domestic resource is preventing the growth of
bioenergy. The challenge is to develop resources fast enough to produce sufficient
amounts for both export and domestic use (Bradley, 2009).
 Many pyrolysis applications are being tested, but not on a scale that allows for the
testing of a particular one over a long period. In addition, the volumes have not been
large enough to prove the reliability and competitiveness of long-distance supply
chains (Bradley, 2009).
 The lack of harmony among incentive tax legislations in different Canadian provinces
is another problem. Table 2.1 shows the tax exemptions in some provinces. This
inconsistency hinders intra-provincial biofuel trade (Bradley, 2009).
Incentive Policies
Some of the federal and provincial incentive programs are listed below:
 In 2007, Sustainable Development Technology Canada (SDTC) announced a $500
million NextGen Biofuels Fund to partially support the establishment of a first-of-
its-kind large demonstration scale facility (Government of Canada, 2007).
 In June 2010, Denis Lebel, Minister of State for Canada Economic Development, an-
nounced three financial contributions totalling $1,090,358 to support the development
of the forest biomass sector in La Matapédia RCM.
 Some provinces have enacted incentive policies, some of which are shown in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Provincial renewable fuel incentives (Bradley, 2009)
Province Mandate Incentive
BC 5% ethanol, 5% biodiesel-Jan 2010 14.5¢/` tax exemption, BC
fuel only
Alberta 5% ethanol, 2% biodiesel-July 2010 9¢/` tax exemption, Alta
fuel only





8.5% ethanol(Gas) 15¢/` producer credit 2010-
12, Man only
10¢/` 2013-15, Man only
Ontario
5% ethanol(Gas) 2007 20¢/` producer incentive
10% ethanol(Gas) 2010
2.1.4 Solar
The origin of solar energy is the burnt hydrogen in the core of the sun. The sun’s energy has
been bombarding our planet since the formation of our solar system, but solar technologies
have only been under development for about 40 to 60 years. Solar energy is used to
produce heat for water heaters and air conditioners (solar thermal) and electricity (solar
photovoltaic (PV) energy). In a solar thermal application, a solar panel gathers solar
radiation to heat air or water for domestic, commercial or industrial use. Solar PV directly
converts sunlight to electricity to be stored in batteries, to be used directly or to be sent
to the general grid. The efficiency of solar PV is only 24% in the most modern equipment,
while solar thermal systems are 70% to 90% efficient (Energy World, 2010; Lozanova, 2008).
However, solar energy is a favored form of energy, because it helps reduce GHG emissions.
Canada has abundant solar energy resources. Figure 2.9 shows the solar energy situation
in the country.
The capital cost of producing electricity through PV cells is $10,000 to $14,000 per KW,
which is more expensive than that of other renewable sources. However, one of the main
benefits of solar resources is its ability to provide energy for people living in stand-alone
units in inaccessible areas. These areas are not connected to the grid. PV cells are used
as off-grid electricity generators to supply electricity for
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Figure 2.9: Yearly PV potential map for latitude tilt in Canada (Natural Resources Canada,
2010)




 cottages and remote residences,
 parks in remote regions, and
 supplying occasional power.
Incentive Programs
Federal and provincial incentive plans are designed to encourage residential and commercial
sectors to use solar systems to produce heat and electricity. Some of the plans are listed
below (The Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Institute of Canada, 2010):
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 The ecoENERGY for Renewable Heat Program: This program is administrated by
Natural Resources Canada and runs from April 1, 2007 to March 31, 2011. Incentives
are offered to the industrial/commercial/institutional sector to install energy-efficient
solar air and/or water heating systems. Solar thermal, solar air and solar photovoltaic
equipment are eligible under this plan.
 Ontario Solar Thermal Heating Incentive (OSTHI): The Ontario Government has
budgeted $14.4 million, which is available until March 31, 2011, to encourage different
sectors to install solar thermal heating equipment. This program is administered by
the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure (Ontario).
 Ontario Power Authority (OPA) Electricity Retrofit Incentive Program: Commercial
building owners/tenants will receive a rebate from OPA if they retrofit their building
with solar hot water heaters and other electricity saving equipment.
 Solar Energy Systems Rebate, in Ontario: When homeowners or builders install
energy systems into residential premises, or expand or upgrade an existing solar
energy system, Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) paid on solar energy systems will be
returned to them. This plan applies to the systems that were purchased and installed
in residential premises before January 1, 2010.
2.1.5 Geothermal
Geothermal energy is obtained from the stored energy of the sun in the ground soil and
water under the surface soil. The free thermal energy can be moved from the ground by
drilling wells or building pumping systems, in which the heat transfer fluid is circulating in
pipes and transferring the heat to homes to provide warm water or air. Heat exchangers use
the heat from the earth to heat water to create steam, which turns turbines for electricity
generation purposes (Canadian Geothermal Association, 2010).
The average temperature a few meters below the earth’s surface is similar to the average
annual air temperature; for example, the average ground temperature a few meters under
the earth’s surface is about 10.1 ◦C in Toronto. This is not a high temperature, so the
heat should be concentrated or upgraded, but what is favorable about the temperature is
that it remains constant throughout the year (Canadian GeoExchange Coalition, 2010).
Most of the promising Canadian sites to develop enhanced geothermal systems (EGS)
are located in British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan (depths ranging from 3.5 to 6.5
km). Deeper wells also exist across the country, for example in Ontario. In commercial lev-
els, these projects must overcome special conditions; subsurface rock must be hydraulically
fractured to create cracks that water can penetrate through. In addition, an outside source
of water is required, and the drilling process is expensive. Although Canada is located on
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the Pacific Ring of Fire, where huge geothermal potential exists, and also home to some of
the continent’s geothermal power developers in different places such as Nevada and Cali-
fornia, formal EGS development does not yet exist. The Canadian Geothermal Association
believes that Canada could develop 5,000 megawatts of conventional geothermal power by
2015, with wells less than 3 km deep (Tyler Hamilton, 2010).
2.2 Non-Renewable Energy Sources
Renewable energy accounts for 16.1% of the total energy production in Canada, so the
rest is provided by non-renewable resources, such as oil, gas, coal, and nuclear energy.
Figure 2.10 illustrates the position of each source in the energy supply in Canada. The
first three energy suppliers are fossil fuels, which play a considerable role in GHG emissions.
Greenhouse gases consists of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs), per-fluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexa-fluoride (SF6).
Nuclear energy is a clean source of energy if the existence of nuclear waste is ignored. This
section provides an overview of the situation of non-renewable energy sources in Canada.




Coal supplies about 11% of Canada’s energy and 19.1% of its electricity (Figures 2.10,2.17).
British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan have the largest coal reserves and resources in
Canada that are actively mined. Canada produces both thermal and coking coals. About
70 percent of domestic coal production is thermal coal, which is consumed by electricity-
generation plants. Coking coal is also referred to as metallurgical coal and is a high-carbon
type of coal used in blast furnaces to smelt iron ore for iron and steel production (Natural
Resources Canada, 2008a).
Canada is a mid-size producer of coal, and over half of its production is domestically
used to generate electricity. The rest is exported. Canada is a large exporter of metal-
lurgical coal, which accounts for 90% of its coal exports. Although the country is a net
exporter of coal, it also imports coal mostly from the US to the central and eastern parts of
the country. Because of Canada’s geographical expanse, importing coal from the eastern
and central US is cheaper than purchasing it from western coal-rich provinces (Natural
Resources Canada, 2008a).
Coal Consumption Policy
The Canadian energy policy is to reduce its coal consumption, because coal, while cheap,
is the dirtiest energy producer in terms of GHG emissions. For example, in 2007, 100.5
megatonnes (MT) out of 126.6 MT of CO2 emissions in the electricity production sector
was due to coal (Office of Energy Efficiency, 2009).
On June 23, 2010, Environment Minister Jim Prentice announced that Environment
Canada aims to regulate GHG emissions from coal-fired power plants. According to this
regulation, which is expected to be firmed up by early 2011, all new coal-fired plants and
those that have reached their economic end of life are required to meet the new standard,
matching the lower GHG emissions of more efficient natural-gas fired plants. The federal
target is a 17% reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels by 2020. The previous target
was a 20% reduction from 2006 emission level by 2020 (Government of Canada, 2010).
Ontario’s energy policy facilitates GHG reduction to a considerable extent. Ontario
Power Generation (OPG) shut down four units of two coal-fired generation plants, ac-
counting for a generating capacity of 2000 MW, in October 2010. These units will be
converted to gas and biomass. This action is a part of the four coal-fired plant phase-outs
anticipated in the province by 2014 (Ontario Government, 2009b).
However, it is not possible to phase-out all the coal facilities in the country, because
other energy resources would not be able to take the place of coal in meeting Canada’s
energy needs. Therefore, Canada’s plan is to advance clean coal technologies (CCT) by
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testing the use of biomass in coal-fueled generating stations and carbon capturing mech-
anisms. Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) has developed a Clean Coal Technology
Roadmap. It has also made financial contributions to the Canadian Clean Power Coalition
projects to develop the technologies that can be used to extract coal’s energy with GHG
emissions at the same level as natural-gas-fired plants (Coal Association of Canada, 2009).
2.2.2 Natural Gas
Canada is the third largest producer of natural gas after the US and Russia. More than half
of Canadian natural gas production is exported to the United States. Natural gas accounts
for about 5% of the electricity production and about 30% of the primary energy supply
in Canada. Among fossil fuels, natural gas is the cleanest in terms of GHG emissions and
emits less than half of carbon dioxide emitted by coal (Energy Information Administration,
2008).
Natural gas is usually produced from conventional sources and in gaseous deposits.
However, it also has unconventional sources, such as coalbed methane (methane trapped in
coal deposits) and tight gas (methane found in low permeability rock formations) (Natural
Resources Canada, 2009b).
The industrial and power generation sectors account for 58% of natural gas consump-
tion, and the rest is consumed by residential and commercial sectors. Ontario and Alberta
are major consumers. Ontario’s demand is mostly in residential and commercial sectors,
while Alberta’s consumption is for its large industrial and energy sector, in particular the
oil sands operations (Natural Resources Canada, 2009b).
Decrease in Production
Production of natural gas in Canada increased between the 1990s and early 2000s. However,
since 2002, production has dropped, such that the amount of natural gas produced in 2006
was close to the amount in 2002. Figure 2.11 shows the production trend of natural gas in
Canada.
The production reduction is due to the decrease in Western Canada’s supply, which ac-
counts for 98% of the Canada’s natural gas supply, virtually all the natural gas production
in the country. The main consumers of natural gas are home and business heating uses
and the oil-sand industry, which use the gas to extract oil from the bitumen. Currently,
unconventional gas, offshore and northern resources, and imports of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) contribute to meet the demand (Natural Resources Canada, 2009b).
Canada’s National Energy Board has developed an analysis to investigate gas produc-
tion in various scenarios. Figure 2.12 shows the supply for different cases. In all scenarios,
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Figure 2.11: Natural gas production in Canada (Natural Resources Canada, 2009b)
the increase in demand is considered, and in order to meet the demand, efficiency improve-
ment projects and using alternative fuels are the primary assumptions. The scenarios are
explained below (National Energy Board, 2010a):
 In the Reference Case scenario, gas demand rises 45% between 2005 and 2030 in the
oil-sands and electricity generation industries.
 In the Continuing Trends scenario also, gas demand rises 45 per cent between 2005
and 2030. The simultaneous decline in availability is partially compensated for by
unconventional gas development. In addition to unconventional gas, more gas pro-
duction from the North is expected by 2014. Furthermore, imports gradually exceed
exports and make Canada a net gas importer before the end of the projection period.
 In the Triple E scenario, gas production in Western Canada levels off by 80% by 2030
from current production levels. This decline occurs because of low gas prices, which
prevent producers investing in other gas resources such as unconventional gas or
developments in the North. In addition, it is presumed that LNG imports produce
half of the gas available by 2030, and these imports are cheaper than developing
northern and unconventional gas. In this scenario, imports gradually exceed exports
and Canada will be a net gas importer before 2030.
 In this scenario, representing the most aggressive expansion, the decline is partially
balanced by unconventional gas production. More gas supply from the North by 2014
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Figure 2.12: Canadian natural gas production scenarios (National Energy Board, 2010a)
is another expectation. In the Fortified Islands scenario, security concerns restrict
worldwide LNG supply, and consequently the import. Development of unconven-
tional and northern gas causes Canada’s gas exports to rise.
To sum up, the decrease in the resources in Western Canada will lead the country to
invest in the development of additional northern, offshore and unconventional gas sources
and to import LNG. All these approaches can help Canada to keep its current supply, but
not increase it. Therefore, the country may not be a significant gas exporter for the next
two decades.
Natural Gas’s Energy to Electricity
The most basic mechanism to produce electricity is steam generating units. To do so,
natural gas is burnt in a boiler to heat water and produce steam. The steam, then, turns a
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turbine to generate electricity. These steam generation units have a low efficiency of about
33 to 35 percent.
The other mechanism uses gas turbines and combustion engines. The gas is heated and
then pressurized in pipes and then used to drive turbines. These types of turbines are used
in peak-load demand periods, as it is possible to quickly and easily turn them on.
Combined-cycle units are used in many new natural gas fired power plants. In this
mechanism, both gas turbines and steam units work together. The hot gas is pressurized
to drive the turbines, and the waste heat from the gas-turbine process is used in steam
units to boil the water in boilers. Combined-cycle plants can achieve thermal efficiencies
of up to 50 to 60 percent.
2.2.3 Oil
Oil is a largest supplier of primary energy in Canada, providing 34% of the supply in
2007 (Figure 2.10). Canada is the seventh largest oil producer in the world, and the oil
production has had an increasing trend in the last two decades. Oil sands operations have
been contributing to about half of the oil production in the country. Figure 2.13 shows
crude oil production until 2006. Canada’s oil reserves are enough to meet demand for the
next 200 years at current rates of production. The Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin,
which underlies Alberta, Saskatchewan and part of the Northwest Territories, is the area
where most of Canada’s oil is found.
Most of Canada’s crude oil comes from the western provinces: Alberta (68.8%), BC
(1.5%), Saskatchewan (16.1%) and Manitoba (0.7%). In 2006, Eastern Canada’s pro-
duction accounted for 11.9% of Canada’s overall production, with NL being the most
contributing province in the east with 11.4% of oil production. The factors that affect
the conventional oil and oil sands developments in the country, according to Natural Re-
sources Canada, are skilled labor shortages, water availability, environmental regulations,
rising costs of labor, refining/upgrading, pipeline capacity constraints, and natural gas
shortages. Social challenges, such as the challenge of building new community infrastruc-
tures and surrounding communities where the involved workers live, are also factors arising
from oil sands developments (Natural Resources Canada, 2009c).
The consumption of oil products differs from province to province. For example, furnace
consumption in Western Canada, where natural gas resources are abundant, accounts for
about 6% of total furnace oil consumption in Canada. On the other hand, Atlantic Canada,
where there is less of an abundance of natural gas and with 7% of the Canadian population,
accounts for over 30% of Canada’s furnace oil consumption. In addition, Ontario and
Quebec account for 63% of Canadian consumption. With regards to gasoline consumption,
Ontario and Quebec account for 60% of the total consumption. Western Canada and the
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Figure 2.13: Canadian crude oil production (thousand barrels per day) (Natural Resources
Canada, 2009c)
Atlantic provinces account for 32% and 8% of Canada’s gasoline consumption, respectively.
On average, 43% of the consumed diesel fuel occurs in Ontario and Quebec, while the
western provinces account for 46% of the total consumption. The greater dependence on
this oil product in western provinces is due to having a different fleet composition and a
greater need to truck in this region’s manufacturing market (Natural Resources Canada,
2009c).
Canada has 19 refineries, and the three main refining centers in Canada are Edmonton
(Alberta), Sarnia (Ontario), and Montreal (Quebec). Most provinces have at least one
refinery, but Manitoba, Prince Edward Island or the Territories do not have any. On
average, half of the crude oil of the refineries comes from domestic reserves. The rest is
imported from OPEC countries and the North Sea. Canada is a growing exporter of oil,
and oil accounts for 30% of the net exports of the country. Oil is exported from the west
and the Atlantic region, and imported in eastern and central provinces. In 2006, virtually
all the crude oil exports from Canada were to the USA (Natural Resources Canada, 2009d).
Crude Oil Outlook
Conventional oil production in Canada will decrease as the remaining reserves decline, but
Alberta’s oil sands production is expected to dominate the supply. By 2020, oil sands
will account for about 80% of the crude oil production in the country. Figure 2.14 shows
the projected crude oil production until 2020. However, the oil sands industry is reliant
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upon natural gas to produce heat and hydrogen, so any increase in natural gas prices or
reduction in natural gas supply would directly affect the oil sands industry. Projected
crude oil and petroleum product imports will remain steady for the next 15 years, whereas
crude oil exports will increase by 2010 and remain stable to 2020.
Figure 2.14: Canada crude oil supply forecast (Natural Resources Canada, 2009c)
Total refining capacity in Canada is 332,000 m3/D, and the estimated crude oil produc-
tion in 2009 was 429,028 m3/D, from which about 40% was oil sands production. Canadian
refining capacity has grown in recent years, but the trend should continue. The consump-
tion has been increasing, but globally, industry investment in refining has not kept pace.
This situation plays an important role in the prices of petroleum products (National Energy
Board, 2010b).
2.2.4 Nuclear
Nuclear energy is a non-renewable source of energy. Every form of electricity genera-
tion produces GHG emissions in mining, building the plants, transportation sections, and
building the infrastructures. Although using nuclear energy for electricity generation will
produce radioactive wastes, the amount of GHG emissions is less than that of other non-
renewable sources. Figure 2.15 shows the amount of CO2 emission per TWh electricity
generation in Ontario.
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Figure 2.15: Comparative life-cycle GHG emissions for Ontario electricity generation sec-
tor (Canadian Nuclear Association, 2009)
Canada has 22 CANDU reactors, 18 of which are in service. Figure 2.16 shows the
locations of the 22 reactors in the country. Table 2.2 indicates the Canadian nuclear
sites. Units 1 and 2 of Bruce A, Point-Lepreau nuclear generating station, and unit 3
of Pickering A are currently under refurbishment (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission,
2010a). Canada has been using nuclear energy for 47 years. The oldest operating units,
which produce electricity, belong to the Pickering site and became operational in 1971.
Figure 2.16: CANDU reactors in Canada (Canadian Nuclear Association, 2009)
Canada is the world’s largest producer of natural uranium; Saskatchewan’s deposits
provide about 21% of global uranium production. Nuclear energy is used for peaceful
purposes such as electricity generation, medicine, agriculture, research, and manufacturing
in Canada. Over 50% of the global supply of medical isotopes for medical purposes is
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Table 2.2: List of Nuclear reactors in Canada (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission,
2010a)
Site and Location Number of Existing Units Gross Generation Capacity
Pickering A (ON) 4 4×542 MW
Pickering B (ON) 4 4×540 MW
Darlington (ON) 4 4×934 MW
Bruce A (ON) 4 4×805 MW
Bruce B (ON) 4 1×845 MW+ 3×872 MW
Gentilly-2 (QC) 1 1×675 MW
Point Lepreau (NB) 1 1×680 MW
provided by Canadian reactors. In 2008, 14.8% of the country’s electricity generation was
produced by a nuclear source(Figure 2.17), with the proportions in Ontario, Quebec, and
New Brunswick (NB) being 53% , 3%, and 6.1%, respectively. It should be noted that
the Point-Lepreau generation unit in NB is currently under refurbishment, but it normally
produces 50% of the province’s electricity.
Radioactive Waste
According to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC) Regulatory Policy Man-
aging Radioactive Waste, radioactive waste is “any material (liquid, gaseous or solid) that
contains a radioactive nuclear substance for which the owner has no foreseen use and
is determined to be a waste product.” CNSC has classified radioactive waste into four
groups (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 2009). The explanation of each class and
its related disposal methods is explained below:
 Low-level radioactive waste (LLRW): LLRW contains material with a consid-
erable amount of radionuclide content, but has limited long-lived activity. This type
of waste does not require significant shielding while it is held in interim storages or
handled by nuclear workers.
 Intermediate-level radioactive waste (ILRW): ILRW waste needs shielding dur-
ing handling and interim storage. The organizations that produce LLRW and ILRW
are responsible for the waste management. There is as of yet no long-term man-
agement facility for these two types of waste. The waste management usually takes
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Figure 2.17: Electricity generation in Canada for 2008 (Canadian Nuclear Association,
2009)
place on the site of the waste owner. Some of these wastes contain a small amount
of radioactive materials, so the radioactivity decays in hours or days, and then the
waste can be disposed by conventional methods.
 High-level radioactive waste (HLRW): HLRW is used nuclear fuel that generates
heat. Currently, no long-term management facilities for high-level nuclear fuel waste
exists anywhere in the world, and used nuclear fuel in Canada is currently held
on site in interim storage facilities. Used fuel bundles are used to hold HLRW on
site. Interim storage of HLRW consists of two phases known as wet storage and dry
storage. At first, used nuclear fuel bundles are removed from the reactors and stored
under water in bays or pools. The fuel cools off in a shielded leak-proof and secure
facility. After 6 to 10 years, the used nuclear fuel is transferred to dry storage in
concrete containers.
 Uranium mine and mill waste: This type of waste is generated during the mining
and milling of uranium ore and the production of uranium concrete. Uranium mining
and milling waste contains long-lived radioactive elements and will not significantly
decrease over a long period of time. Since a large volume of waste is generated during
mining and milling, the only suitable option for waste management is to develop long-
term waste management facilities close to the mining sites. Cameco Corporation
and Areva Resources Inc., located in Saskatchewan, are the only facilities operating
uranium mines and mills in Canada.
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The history of developing nuclear energy in Canada is provided in Chapter 4 in order
to have a good understanding about the background of this energy source in the country.
2.3 Energy Situation in Ontario
In this section Ontario’s energy situation is explored based on Ontario’s Long-term Energy
Plan report, which was published by the government (Ontario Government, 2010). Ontario
is going forward to improving its reliable and renewable energy system. Ontario is the
most successful Canadian province in solar and wind power and seeks a diverse supply
mix of energy. Ontario’s Landmark Green Energy and Green Economy Act, Ontario’s
2010 Economic Outlook and Fiscal Review, and Ontario Clean Energy Benefit are the
representatives of the province’s attempt to reach its energy related goals. Energy sector
employs more than 95,000 of Ontarians. Regarding the environmental issues, Ontario has
been made a great progress in energy sector. In 2009, more than 80 percent of the electricity
generation came from emission-free sources, and the amount of GHG emission in that year
was the lowest amount in the past 45 years.
The province is a net exporter of electricity and is able to meet the current energy
demand. However, it needs to supply 15,000 MW electricity over the next 20 years to
supply the future demand. The increase in demand is due to Ontario’s economic recovery,
growing population, industrial growth, and increased usage of electrical appliances, such
as electric cars. For example, Ontario’s plan is that by 2020, five percent of the vehicles on
the roads are electric. The conservation culture is also growing and helps the province to
observe a moderate increase in electricity demand over the next 20 years. This means the
province has to upgrade and update the energy grid system and create new or rebuild some
of the existing electricity capacities. The government needs to increase energy prices in
order to finance the required progress. Energy prices are expected to increase 3.5 and 2.5
percent per year for the residential and industrial sectors, respectively. To help the families,
farms and businesses with the increased energy prices, Ontario has offered Ontario Clean
Energy Benefit, which if passed, can give Ontario families, farms, and small businesses a
10 per cent benefit on their monthly bills for 5 years.
The predicted long-term demand growth is illustrated in Figure 2.18. Three scenarios
are considered to analyze the rate of the growth in the province. In the low growth (yellow
curve), it is assumed that the demand grows modestly due to several reasons such as
economic recession. It is also assumed that only 13 percent of people use electricity for
heating, and also electric appliances account for a small portion of electricity consumption.
In the medium growth (brown), a consistent move towards high-tech and service industries
along with the higher provincial population growth is assumed. In this scenario, the
demand will increase moderately by 15 percent by 2030. High growth scenario (orange)
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Figure 2.18: Range of energy demand forecast (Ontario Government, 2010)
represents an aggressive electrification situation in the province. Faster population growth
and significant industrial change are among the factors assumed in this scenario. Ontario
plans to be prepared to provide sufficient capacity for the future demand. It should be
noted that in addition to conservation and electricity supply, electricity storage technologies
can considerably help the government to meet the demand with a supply mix generation
system.
The key features of the plan are as follows (Ontario Government, 2010):
 Ontario’s population increases by 15 percent until 2030, and subsequently, the re-
mand will moderately increase.
 Ontario will phase out all the coal units by 2014.
 Clean nuclear energy will maintain the source of 50 percent of electricity supply.
Therefore, Ontario has to rebuild or replace its old nuclear fleet.
 Ontario will add 9,000 MW of hydroelectric capacity to the grid. Niagara Tunnel
and Lower Mattagami projects are the most important projects contributing to this
goal.
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 The province will improve its renewable energy capacity (excluding hydroelectric) by
10,700 MW by 2018.
 Natural gas will support the grid in peak demand times, the increase in renewable
sources, and modernization refurbishment of nuclear electricity generators.
 The energy efficient plan of Combined Heat and Power will be chased by the province.
 Five transmission projects are under development in the province.
 Ontario will also proceed in conservation plans, and its target is to reduce the overall
demand by 28 TWh by 2030.
 Investment of $87 billion in the energy sector is planned and will help the government
to pursue the clean energy supply.
 The long-term energy plan will create job opportunities and contribute to clean
energy economy.
 Electricity prices will increase in residential and industrial sectors.
 Government’s proposed Ontario Clean Energy Benefit, will give Ontarians a 10 per
cent benefit on their electricity bills for five years.
 To help families, Ontario will add another 10 hours to the lowest cost period weekly.
 The province will provide Seniors and low and middle-income Ontarians with extra
tax credits.
2.3.1 Water
Hydropower has been generated in Ontario since 100 years ago. Currently, it makes up
90% of Ontario’s renewable energy supply. Ontario’s hydroelectricity potential is not that
much – about one fourth of Quebec’s. However, Ontario seeks its goal to develop 9,000
MW of hydroelectric capacity by 2018. Niagara Tunnel and Mattagami projects are the
most important ongoing hydro projects in the province, and some other potential projects
are under consideration. However, building large-scale hydro plants is not economically
feasible since they have to be built in remote areas. Their environmental impacts, which
were discussed earlier, is another barrier.
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2.3.2 Wind, Solar, and Bioenergy
With regards to Wind and solar energy, Ontario is Canada’s leading province, and four
largest wind and solar farms, such as the world’s largest photovoltaic solar farm and
Canada’s largest wind farm, are located in this province. Ontario has made a huge progress
in renewable energy supply since 2003. In 2003, Ontario had 10 wind turbines, while cur-
rently, it has 700 turbines. More than 16,000 renewable energy contracts has been signed
since 2003. It is worth noting that Feed-in Tariff Program, which supports small and large
renewable projects, has played an important role in this progress.
The future of renewable energy is very promising in Ontario. National and international
investors have already announced their plans to participate in Ontario’s clean energy econ-
omy. For example, Samsung and Siemens have proposed plans to build Ontario’s first wind
turbine blade manufacturing plant, which will create about 900 jobs. Ontario’s plan is to
generate 10,700 MW of renewable capacity by 2018. This planned development is based
on the medium growth of electricity demand.
2.3.3 Coal
In 2003,coal was the supplier of 25 percent of generation capacity in Ontario. Its con-
tribution decreased by the governments plans of gradually closure of coal plants. Coal is
amongst the most polluting fuels. As mentioned earlier, the closure of coal-fired plants
played an important role in the decrease of GHG emissions (Figure 2.19), and the final
purpose of the plan is to phase out coal resources by 2014. Since 2005, eight coal units
have been closed, four units in 2005 and four in October 2010. After the closure of these
units, coal accounts for 13 percent of electricity capacity in Ontario. The closed coal units
are as follows:
 Lakeview (Mississauga): four units closed April, 2005
 Nanticoke: two units closed October, 2010
 Lambton: two units closed October, 2010
Other units in Nanticoke and Lambton and coal-fired plants in Thunder Bay and
Atikokan will also be closed. Atikokan generating station will be converted to a biomass
generating station, and Thunder Bay generating station will partially converted to natural
gas station by 2013.
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Figure 2.19: Actual and projected GHG emissions 1990-2030 forecast (Ontario Govern-
ment, 2010)
2.3.4 Natural Gas
Currently, Ontario’s natural gas electricity capacity is 9,500 MW. In 2009, natural gas
accounted for 10% of Ontario’s electricity generation, and the plan is to maintain natural
gas as the supplier of 10% of the electricity in future. It is much cleaner than coal. Natural
gas plants’ most outstanding advantage is that they are flexible and can respond quickly
to the demand’s fluctuations. This feature is very important for Ontario considering the
phase out of coal-fired plants and refurbishment of old nuclear facilities. From 2015 to
2020, when the major parts of the nuclear fleet refurbishment procedures will be done, and
in the absence of coal-fired plants, natural gas will be a back up for electricity grid in the
province.
2.3.5 Nuclear
Nuclear power produces about 50 per cent of the electricity generated in Ontario. It does
not produce GHG emissions and air contaminants. Nuclear power plants can provide
consistent supply of energy, and the production costs are very stable. The reason for that
is that the fuel costs are much lower than the construction costs, so the fluctuations in the
fuel costs do not affect the total nuclear electricity price.
Nuclear energy has a history of 40 years in Ontario, and the industry contains 70,000
direct and indirect employees. The history of developing nuclear energy in Canada is
provided in Chapter 4 in order to have a good understanding about the background of
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this energy source in the country. Bruce B and Darlington nuclear sites are becoming
close to the end of their lives, and have to be closed for three years to be upgraded. The
economy recession and the considerable contribution of renewable energy resources removes
the intence pressure on the province to build or rebuild nuclear fleet, but Ontario requires
new nuclear capacity to meet its long-term energy need. Ontario’s plan and the challenges
that it is facing are discussed in Section 5.1.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the author provides an overview of the energy situation in Canada. Canada
possesses great potential for developing renewable energy sources, especially wind technol-
ogy. Currently, hydro power supplys 60% of the electricity in the country. The demand,
however, is increasing. Although renewable sources can be improved, they are not suffi-
cient to meet the growing demand in the near future. Fossil fuels, on the other hand, are
polluting. Nuclear energy accounts for about 15% of the country’s electricity and 50% of
Ontario’s electricity. Since nuclear energy is abundant and is not a polluting source with
respect to greenhouse gases and other pollutants, it does not have the limitations of the
renewable and fossil fuel resources. Therefore, the development of nuclear technology will
change the energy future of the country.
A number of comprehensive energy studies have been carried out or are underway in
Canada. In particular, the Canadian Academy of Engineering (CAE) is an organization
working on strategic planning in the energy field. CAE is composed of experts and distin-
guished engineers who provide strategic advice with regard to important issues affecting
Canada. Currently, the academy has about 400 members. In recent years, CAE has been
working on energy strategies and has published several reports. The academy is develop-
ing an energy pathway for the country and is investigating different energy patterns. In a
recent report, CAE experts studied all of the different sources of energy, grid infrastructure
and GHG emissions (Bowman and Albion, 2009). In fact, the CAE work constitutes the
most comprehensive and in-dept analyses about Canada’s energy future. Therefore, the
CAE’s views and ideas are highly respected and could be very influential.
CAE uses the ProGrid methodology (Bowman, 2005) in its energy studies. ProGrid is
a systems methodology and a decision making tool falling under the umbrella of multiple
criteria decision analysis. Applying this methodology requires the participation of experts
to assess the energy options according to different criteria. Therefore, the expertise of
the evaluators plays an important role in achieving proper results. In one of the published
reports, the academy proposed energy pathways to meet the energy demands of the country
in the near and long-term future. Figure 2.20 is provided by CAE (Bowman and Griesbach,
2007) and illustrates Canada’s energy situation. The academy believes that Canada has
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the potential to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels and to place more of an emphasis
on renewable and nuclear technologies in the future.
Figure 2.20: Electricity generation in Canada in 2007 (Bowman and Griesbach, 2007)
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Chapter 3
Canadian Energy Systems Simulator
In this chapter, the goal is to develop some energy simulations in order to obtain a better
understanding about the energy issue in the country. In this regard, the Canadian Energy
Systems Simulator (CanESS) is introduced. The information that was obtained in the
previous chapter helps the author in defining energy scenarios by using CanESS modeling
platform. The simulation results will also indicate how important the nuclear energy is to
the country.
3.1 Introducing CanESS
The Canadian Energy Systems Simulator (CanESS) is a tool which was developed by
“Whatif? Technologies” company, located in Ottawa, Ontario. The company was founded
in 1989 by Robert Hoffman and Bert McInnis. Using a dynamic systems modeling ap-
proach, CanESS provides support for strategic and policy analysis in the energy field. In
this platform, a wide range of energy systems scenarios over the long term can be sim-
ulated and explored rapidly. Energy scenarios can be compared in terms of parameters
in Canadian provinces. Parameters such as GHG emissions and the amount of electricity
production can be analyzed by defining different scenarios. This way, CanESS examines
the impacts of changes in parameters within the scenarios and provides insights to the
decision makers in related fields. Using CanESS’s simulations, an analyst may reveal the
challenges and define problems that may be resolved and analyzed by policy alternatives
or changes in the behavior of decision makers and consumers.
CanESS is calibrated from 1978 to 2006 in one year steps. The data base is provided by
a wide variety of data sources including Statistics Canada censuses and surveys, the energy
end-use data bases compiled by the Demand Policy Analysis Division, Natural Resources
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Canada, and technical data from engineering studies and the GHGenius life cycle model
for Canada.
The structure of CanESS is shown in Figure 3.1. First, the context for the energy system
is set in terms of population, households and gross domestic product to the time horizon
of the simulation – the user can set values for migration flows, fertility and mortality pa-
rameters, and per capita GDP. Then the transportation, residential, commercial buildings
and industrial models calculate the energy currencies – hydrocarbon fuels, electricity, and
hydrogen required to deliver services at a level commensurate with the economic context.
Essentially, these models keep track of the stocks – vehicles, houses, buildings, etc. –
and associate conversion efficiencies with the vintages of the stocks. The model user can
set the efficiencies of future vintages and the rates at which new or alternative technolo-
gies penetrate into the stocks. Then these requirements for energy currencies along with
those required to produce energy sources are fed to process models that calculate energy
feedstocks required to produce the energy currencies. The feedstock production models
represent the resources – conventional, oil sands, natural gas, coal, uranium, and biomass
– and the rate at which the resources can be produced. Differences between feedstocks
required and feedstocks produced are made up by international trade (CanESS, 2009).
Figure 3.1: CanESS structure (CanESS, 2009)
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3.2 CanESS Models and Applications
In this chapter, we discuss the two following models provided by CanESS, which are related
to our study:
 Electricity generation modeling
 GHG emission modeling
In the following sections we try to describe how these models work, and how they are
related. In addition, the aim is to change some parameters such as population to see how
they affect GHG emissions.
In this chapter, the goal is to investigate the amount of GHG emissions in two case
studies. Ontario plans to close two of eight coal units at the Nanticoke station near
Simcoe and two of four units at the Lambton plant near Sarnia by 2014, but last year,
the government announced that it would close these units by October 2010. Figure 3.2
is provided by CanESS to show the planned decommissioning coal electricity production
capacity and the capacity that has been decommissioned since the year 2000.
Figure 3.2: Planned decommissioning for coal electricity production capacity (CanESS,
2010a)
CanESS is used to examine electricity production and GHG emissions in the two case
studies: (a) when the electricity from the Lower Churchill Falls station comes to the grid,
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(b) when the planned new nuclear fleet in Darlington does not come to the grid. These two
projects, Darlington and the Lower Churchill Falls, will have a huge impact on the grid
capacity in Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador, respectively. CanESS will provide
an overview of the energy situation in these two projects, and the results of this study
may be used by energy policy makers in order to provide proper strategic planning. The
results also indicate the positive environmental effects of investing in renewable and nuclear
resources.
3.2.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The GHG emission model is also a very large one. There are many different variables
that contribute to this model. Personal and commercial vehicle emissions, rail and air
transport emissions, fertilizer production emissions, animal based emissions, and different
energy sources’ emissions are among the parameters that affect GHG emissions in the
country. To be more familiar with this model, one of the GHG emissions parameters,
uranium production emissions, is examined.
Figure 3.3: Uranium production emissions procedure (CanESS, 2010c)
Figure 3.3 shows the procedure in which uranium production emissions is calculated.
The model has one procedure with two inputs, one of which, fuel use for uranium produc-
tion, is calculated in another procedure. This input data is presented in terms of petajoule
per year. The data for the other input, energy use emission factors for uranium production,
is obviously obtained from a database, and is in terms of tonnes per petajoule. What needs
to be calculated is Canada’s emissions for processing uranium. Two variables’ graphs are
shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
The amounts of these two graphs have to be multiplied year by year to obtain Canada’s
emissions for uranium production. This output is obtained in this procedure and is shown
in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.4: Fuel use for uranium production (CanESS, 2010a)
GHG Emissions and the Lower Churchill Falls
In this section, the aim is to define a scenario related to the Lower Churchill Falls contract
and implement it by means of CanEss. This way, the impact of constructing this project
is investigated in terms of GHG emissions. First, a short overview about the project
is provided. The plan is to build two stations in the region and produce a combined
capacity of 3,074 MW and 16.7 TWh of electricity per year. Electricity generation is
supposed to begin in 2015 (Nalcor, 2010). Since electricity transmission is a challenge in
this project, the construction is behind schedule. The purpose is to compare the amount
of GHG emissions in the case that these two stations come fully to the grid in 2020 and
in the case that they do not. If the project is not finished by 2020, Ontario coal-fired
plants cannot be decommissioned as scheduled by the government (Ontario Government,
2009b), since according to the previous chapter, water is considered the most important
substitute for coal. Figure 3.7 shows the difference in GHG emissions from 2007 to 2060,
if the electricity of the Lower Churchill Falls comes to the grid and is sold to Ontario and
becomes a substitute for the electricity from coal-fired plants. The two curves are too close
to observe the difference, so Figure 3.8 provides a closer view from the year 2006 to 2040.
The estimated decrease in GHG emissions is about 6 megatonnes in 2020.
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Figure 3.5: Energy use emission factors for uranium production (CanESS, 2010a)
3.2.2 Electricity Generation Modeling
CanESS is a very broad energy platform. In this section the electricity generation model is
explained. Each model in CanESS consists of a few procedures, in which the mathematical
calculations are performed. In the electricity generation model, there are eleven procedures.
Each procedure has some inputs and outputs that may be the outputs or inputs of other
procedures. As an example, “Electricity for Enriched Uranium Production”, one of the
procedures of the electricity generation model, is shown in Figure 3.9. As can be seen in
the figure, there are three inputs into this procedure, one of which is coming from another
procedure. Enriched uranium production (EUProd), electricity per unit enriched uranium
(elecPerEU) and electricity for enriched uranium production history (elecForEUPH) are
the inputs that can calculate the electricity for enriched uranium production (elecForEUP)
in this procedure. The output is calculated by the following formulations:
Prior to 2007, electricity for EU production, elecForEUP, was equal to elecForEUPH.
However the future of elecForEUP is calculated by multiplying EUProd by elecPerEU.
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Figure 3.6: Fuel use for uranium production (CanESS, 2010a)
New Electricity Production Capacity
New Electricity Production Capacity is one of the variables in the “Electricity Generation”
model in CanESS, and its model-based name is “newElecPrdCap”. This variable introduces
the history and the future trend of the new installed electricity capacity. This variable helps
the analyst to have an understanding of the role of different electricity sources in the future.
Figure 3.10 shows the situation of new electricity production capacity in the country. The
electricity generation in Ontario is also illustrated in Figure 3.11.
As can be seen in Figure 3.11, in Ontario, nuclear energy, which is shown by a red
line, plays an important role in electricity production. In addition to nuclear energy, gas
is also an important contributing source. As explained in the first chapter, gas is not
a very reliable source, because it is a fossil fuel, and it is possible that its extraction is
going to decline in the future. In addition, gas is an important source of the whole energy
production, and a small portion of it is used for electricity generation purposes. These
facts make the nuclear source more outstanding.
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Figure 3.7: The difference between GHG emissions in the two scenarios (CanESS, 2010a)
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, the CanESS platform is introduced. CanESS is a numerical tool for
modeling the energy system of Canada. One example is provided to show how this model
works. Two important parts of this extremely large model are introduced: Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Electricity Generation Modeling. In Section 3.2.1, the effect of entering the
Lower Churchill Falls into the grid on GHG emissions is investigated. In Section 3.2.2,
the attempt is to give a better understanding of the situation of the resources used for
electricity generation purposes. Subsequently, the significant role of the new capacity of
nuclear energy is illustrated.
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Figure 3.8: The difference between GHG emissions in the two scenarios (CanESS, 2010a)
Figure 3.9: Electricity for enriched uranium production procedure (CanESS, 2010b)
53





































Figure 3.10: New Electricity Production Capacity in Canada (CanESS, 2010a)




































Figure 3.11: New Electricity Production Capacity in Ontario (CanESS, 2010a)
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Chapter 4
History of Nuclear Technology and
Canada’s Role
In this chapter, the history of the development of nuclear energy is provided. The history
will talk about how the nuclear energy was introduced to Canada, and how the country
became involved in this matter. The material provided in this chapter is helpful to have a
background about nuclear energy in the country, and is useful to understand the importance
of this energy source. The insights provided in Chapter 4 is important for the strategic
study that is done in Chapter 5.
4.1 The Manhattan Project
In this section, the history of the development of nuclear energy is provided, and the role
of Canada in this matter is studied.
4.1.1 Einstein’s Letter
The Manhattan Project was a secret project of the US government during the World War
II that succeeded in developing the nuclear bomb during the war. It is believed that the
letter from Albert Einstein to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt triggered the plan
to build the nuclear bomb in this country. In the letter (which Einstein would later refer
to as the greatest mistake of his life) he talks about the possibility of constructing an
extremely powerful bomb and gives some hints that the German government might be
working on making this bomb. The letter was written on August 2, 1939, and is shown in
Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Einstein’s letter to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, page 1 (Elert, 1997)
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Figure 4.2: Einstein’s letter to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, page 2 (Elert, 1997)
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Einstein wrote the letter with the help of the Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, who had
escaped from Nazi Germany to the US, and fellow Hungarian refugee physicists Edward
Teller and Eugene Wigner, who felt a responsibility to inform the US government about
the possibility that German scientists might build an atomic bomb very soon.
Roosevelt received the letter. Because he was very busy with the events in Europe, it
took about two months for him to arrange a meeting with Alexander Sachs, who was an
economist and his long-time friend and unofficial advisor, to discuss the letter. They met
on October 11, 1939. Sachs read from a cover letter he had prepared and briefed Roosevelt
on the main points contained in Einstein’s letter.
On October 19, 1939, Roosevelt wrote back to Einstein and informed him that he had
set up a committee consisting of Sachs and representatives from the Army and Navy to
study the proposal to make a nuclear bomb. He did not want to take the risk that Germans
aquire the nuclear bomb before the US (Rossenfeld, 2009).
4.1.2 Atomic Bomb Research in Other Countries
Meanwhile, the British, who made good progress in pursuing the development of the nuclear
bomb at the beginning of the war, could not continue their effort, because they were directly
involved in the war. Therefore, the British reluctantly agreed that their scientists take part
in the Americans’ research. The Russians were also working on this matter very seriously,
but their first successful test was in 1949, after the war had ended. The Germans were also
unsuccessful in completing their project, so the US, which entered the war later than other
countries, succeeded in making the first nuclear bomb, and briefly held onto an atomic
monopoly (Rossenfeld, 2009).
4.1.3 National Defence Research Committee
Shortly after the beginning of World War II on September 1, 1939, with the German
invasion of Poland, the president of the Carnegie Foundation – an educational research
organization – tried to convince Roosevelt that the government should more seriously
concentrate its scientific efforts on warfare, because sooner or later the US would enter the
war. Having in mind that France was in danger of falling, Roosevelt agreed to establish the
National Defence Research Committee, with Vannevar Bush as the head. The committee
was established in June 1940. Bush reorganized the nuclear research group. He eliminated
the military members, and also the foreign scientists. He also banned publications on
nuclear research. Then, in 1941, Bush became Director of the newly-created Office of
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). The Uranium Committee became the OSRD
Section on Uranium and was codenamed S-1 (Rossenfeld, 2009).
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The National Defence Research Committee, now headed by James B. Conant, Presi-
dent of Harvard University, became an advisory body responsible for making research and
development recommendations to the OSRD.
The progress of OERD was not very significant. Two reports that were published by the
National Academy of Science did not satisfy Bush. However, in July 1941, Bush received
a very outstanding report from a group codenamed the MAUD Committee, the National
Defence Research Committee liaison office in London. MAUD believed that it could build
a bomb in approximately two years. The MAUD group report started a new period in
building the nuclear bomb. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor,
and the US entered the war. Therefore, Americans urged the funding of the project.
4.1.4 Expanding the Research and Canada’s Involvement
In August 1942, the program was placed under the direction of the Army Corps of En-
gineers, and the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) was set up to manage the project.
Some scientists were invited to collaborate in the project. A young Canadian scientist,
Louis Slotin, was one of the experts who was asked to join the US. In 1942, Canada was
invited to the project. Ottawa immediately reopened the Eldorado Mine, which had been
closed at the outset of war. The U.S. now had a steady supply of uranium. Canada was the
only source of uranium outside of Africa. Canada continued supplying uranium to the US
nuclear weapons program until the mid-1960s, when it finally shut down the Eldorado mine
at Great Bear Lake (Rose, 2005). In May 1942, Colonel Leslie R. Groves was appointed to
head the effort, and he chose J. Robert Oppenheimer to be the head of the atomic bomb
research in Los Alamos, New Mexico. By 1944, the researchers at Los Alamos had found
a way to build the bomb. Scientists at other laboratories at Oak Ridge and Hanford were
trying to get a hold of the required amount of enriched uranium and plutonium. At that
time, the war in Europe had almost ended, so the only target was Japan.
By the spring of 1945, the research was finalized, and Americans were ready to test the
weapon. At the same time, they found out that Germany was not even close to building the
bomb. Americans tested the bomb on July 16, 1945, at a remote corner of the Alamagordo
Bombing Range, 210 miles south of Los Alamos, New Mexico, and it was successful. The
test was named the Trinity Test. At that time, Harry S. Truman was the President of the
US (US Department of Energy, 2009).
4.1.5 The Bomb in Hand
Before they had acquired the bomb, the Americans needed the help of the Soviet Union to
attack Japan. The Soviet Union leader, Joseph Stalin, had promised to join the war against
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Japan by August 1944. However, upon obtaining the bomb, the Americans no longer felt
that they needed the assistant of the Soviet Union. On July 24, 1945, Truman told Stalin
that the US has “a new weapon of unusual destructive force.” But the Americans never
informed the Soviet Union about their possession of the atomic bomb.
On July 26, Truman, Stalin, and Clement Attlee, the new British Prime Minister,
issued a warning statement to Japan: surrender or suffer “prompt and utter destruction.”
The Americans never talked to Japan about using the atomic bomb. Although there were
anti-war sentiments among the Japanese, they rejected the Potsdam declaration on July
29, 1945 (US Department of Energy, 2009).
Finally, on August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. By
exploding a 9,700 pound uranium bomb, called Little Boy, 70,000 people were killed, and
another 70,000 were wounded. Because Japan did not surrender, a 10,000 pound atomic
bomb, called Fat Man, was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945. The bomb
killed 40,000 people and injured 60,000. Japan promptly surrendered on August 14 .The
Manhattan Project cost the United States the equivalent of $2 billion in 1945 spending
power and required the combined efforts of a continent-spanning industrial enterprise and
a pool of scientists (Schwartz, 1998)
4.2 Montreal Laboratory
About 70 years ago, Canada was not heavily involved in nuclear research and development.
Research at the National Research Council of Canada (NRCC) laboratories was usually
mission oriented, and there was not much confidence in Canadian scientists to perform
creative scientific projects. By 1940, the attention of the laboratories had shifted almost
entirely to war problems. It was very difficult to catch up with the new technologies while
being isolated from basic research; however, scientific periodicals made Canadian scientific
society aware of the discovery of nuclear fission in 1938. Therefore, Canadian scientists
started carrying out research on nuclear fission along with United States, Britain and
Germany (Laurence, 1980).
After the start of World War II, many of the sources and facilities of Britain were
directed to issues pertaining to the war, so it was suggested that the nuclear research in
England be moved to the USA. Although in the initial years, Britain was more advanced
in the field of nuclear research, the USA was more developed at that time. The American
nuclear group, however, was not interested in the suggestion, because there were people
in the British group who were refugees from other European countries, and American
scientists were worried that their concerns about their relatives in Europe might cause
problems.
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Britain then suggested a joint British-Canadian laboratory be established in Canada
in order to build a pilot plant for the production of plutonium, and the USA agreed to
information exchange with the laboratory. Establishing a joint laboratory was a tough
decision for Canada to make. Canada had to spend a great deal of money to build the
laboratory and recruit the staff. There were also concerns that the project may not be
finished before the end of the war. On the other hand, even after the war, Canada could
benefit from the nuclear technology at least in terms of economics. Therefore, Canadian
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King agreed to the project, and the work began
in Montreal at about the end of the year 1942, as a division of NRCC (Laurence, 1980).
The collaboration between the American nuclear research group and the laboratory did
not progress very well. The main reason was that the Director of the Laboratory, H.H
Halban, could not establish a good relationship between eitherthe Americans or NRCC.
There were misunderstandings and miscommunications among scientists and political lead-
ers. However, after some changes in the management of the laboratory, they reached an
agreement, and the project continued. The design of the construction of a heavy water
moderated nuclear reactor in Canada was made at a meeting of the Combined Policy Com-
mittee in Washington on April 13, 1944. After a score of possible sites was considered, one
near Chalk River was chosen and called the Petawawa Works, and the reactor was named:
NRX (National Research eXperimental). Before NRX was completed, however, it was de-
sirable to have some experience in operating a comparable reactor. On August 24, 1944, a
very simple reactor that could be completed quickly was designed so that its uranium rods
and other parts could easily be changed or rearranged. On September 4, 1945, at Chalk
River, the construction of ZEEP (Zero Energy Experimental Pile) was completed. While
the laboratories were being built at Chalk River, the staff moved there gradually from the
Montreal Laboratory, which was closed down in July 1946. In 1945 and 1946, most of the
British scientists returned to England and began the research that was to lead the United
Kingdom to become the third nuclear military power, and the first to produce electricity
in large nuclear power stations economically (Laurence, 1980).
The first phase of nuclear research and development in Canada, involving the collab-
oration of scientists and engineers from Great Britain, France and other parts of Europe
and the United States, was coming to an end. The center of activity in Canada had moved
to Chalk River and there was reorganization, new direction and new purpose. Gradually,
the CANDU conception of nuclear power stations was to emerge.
4.3 Nuclear Organizations
In this section, Canadian nuclear organizations are introduced, and some related informa-
tion is provided.
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4.3.1 Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL)
History
In 1942, a Canadian-British nuclear research laboratory was established in Montreal. The
laboratory worked under the National Research Council of Canada to develop a design
for a nuclear reactor. According to the history of the Montreal laboratory, in 1946 the
Montreal research laboratory was closed and research was consolidated at Chalk River
Laboratories. Before the laboratory was closed, the first reactor, named Zero Energy
Experimental Pile (ZEEP), had been built in 1945 at the Chalk River laboratories. ZEEP
provided valuable information for the research on heavy-water-moderated fuel for building
future reactors. In 1947, the 42 MWt NRX (National Research eXperimental) reactor was
built at Chalk River, Ontario. It was used for producing radioisotopes, undertaking fuels
and materials development work for the next generation of reactors, Canada Deuterium
Uranium (CANDU) reactors, and providing neutrons for physics experiments. NRX was
the most powerful reactor in the world at the time. In 1952, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.
(AECL) was formed by the government as a federal Crown corporation, and its mission
was to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
On December 12, 1952 one of the world’s first major reactor accidents occurred in
the NRX reactor at AECL’s Chalk River Laboratories, when a combination of human
and mechanical error led to a temporary loss of control over the reactor’s power level.
The reactor building was contaminated, as well as an area of the Chalk River site, and
millions of gallons of radioactive water accumulated in the reactor basement. This water
was pumped to a waste management area of the laboratories and monitored. Hundreds of
military personnel from Canada and the U.S. were employed in the cleanup and disposal
of the reactor debris.
On May 24, 1958, the NRU (National Research Universal) reactor (which is described
in Section 4.3.3) at Chalk River also suffered a major accident. A damaged uranium
fuel rod caught fire and was torn in two as it was being removed from the core due to
inadequate cooling. The fire was extinguished, but not before releasing a sizeable quantity
of radioactive combustion products that contaminated the interior of the reactor building
and, to a lesser degree, an area of the surrounding laboratory site. Over 600 people were
employed in the clean-up.
In 1954, AECL partnered with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario to
build Canada’s first nuclear power plant at Rolphton, Ontario. On June 4, 1962, Canada’s
first nuclear reactor, the Nuclear Power Demonstration (NPD), was put into operation,
generating about 20 MWe. This reactor served a prototype of the CANDU system.
In 1971, the first commercial CANDU reactor, Pickering A 1, began commercial op-
eration. By 1973 the other three reactors of the A group at Pickering were online and
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constituted the most powerful nuclear facility in the world at the time. Each Pickering
unit produces about 600 MWe of power.
With a contract signed in 1991, AECL, in partnership with MDS Nordion, began
construction of the MAPLE dedicated isotope-production facility. Constructed on-site at
AECL’s Chalk River Laboratories, this facility will house two reactors and an isotope
processing facility. Each reactor is designed to be able to produce 100% of the world’s
medical isotopes, meaning that the second reactor will be used as a back-up to ensure an
uninterruptable supply. Construction and licensing delays have so far prevented the facility
from opening.
Medical isotope production using the NRU reactor experienced two forced outages due
to safety concerns (December 2007) and a heavy water leak (May 14, 2009). The production
from the NRU reactor represents a significant fraction of the worlds medical isotope supply
and the disruptions have caused a world-wide shortage. Due to maintenance requirements
from the aging NRU reactor and the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactor projects, the long-term
production of medical isotopes in Canada has become a controversial topic (Brown, 1965).
Missions and Mandates
The AECL’s missions and mandates are listed bellow (AECL, 2009a):
 To be the best nuclear energy company
 To provide safe, reliable, economical and sustainable nuclear energy solutions world-
wide
 To be Canada’s nuclear platform for nuclear science and technological expertise
 To operate a commercially viable, self-sustaining business designing, building and
servicing CANDU nuclear power reactors
4.3.2 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CANSC)
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is committed to Canada’s international
nuclear agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear technology. CNSC protects the health,
safety and security of Canadians as well as the environment.
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History
The Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) was established under the Atomic Energy
Control Act of 1946. Its role was to assist the Government of Canada in its efforts “to
make provision for the control and supervision of the development, application and use of
atomic energy and to enable Canada to participate effectively in measures of international
control of atomic energy.” The AECB had three main functions in the areas of regulation,
mining and research. In the 1950s and 1960s, the mandate of AECB came to focus on
regulating the nuclear sector, establishing health and safety regulations. In 1957, Canada
had a very important role in forming the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
with the support of the United Nations. As part of its mandate, the IAEA establishes and
administers international safeguards for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Over the years,
the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) saw an increased focus on nuclear compliance
and public participation in the licensing process. On May 31, 2000 the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission (CNSC) replaced the AECB.
Missions and Mandates
Under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, CNSC’s mandate involves four major ar-
eas (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 2010b):
 regulation of the development, production and use of nuclear energy in Canada to
protect health, safety and the environment
 regulation of the production, possession, use and transport of nuclear substances, and
the production, possession and use of prescribed equipment and prescribed information
 implementation of measures respecting international control of the development, pro-
duction, transport and use of nuclear energy and substances, including measures re-
specting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices
 dissemination of scientific, technical and regulatory information concerning the ac-
tivities of CNSC, and the effects on the environment, on the health and safety of
persons, of the development, production, possession, transport and use of nuclear
substances
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4.3.3 Reactors in Canada
Research Reactors
 National Research Universal (NRU): National Research Universal (NRU) is one
of the most important reactors that has been operating at Chalk River since 1957.
NRU does not produce electricity, but tests the fuels and materials for CANDU
reactors. It also produces neutrons for the National Research Council’s Neutron
Beam Center to investigate industrial and biological materials. NRU produces the
majority of the world’s medical isotopes used in both the diagnosis and treatment of
life-threatening diseases (AECL, 2010c).
 Zero Energy Deuterium -2 (ZED-2): ZED-2 is the larger version of ZEEP, and
has been operating in Chalk River since 1960. It has been used to study the effects
of heavy water and alternative light water and organic coolants (AECL, 2010d).
CANDU Power Reactors
CANDU reactors have been operating in Canada since 1962, and abroad since 1972.
CANDU technology is unique for its on-power refueling capability, and heavy-water moder-
ator technology. CANDU units have been built in North America, South America, Europe
and Asia, and currently, there are 48 reactors operating around the world whose design
is based on CANDU technology. AECL is the designer and the builder of the CANDU
reactors, and sells them in Canada and other countries, and it is responsible for managing
and maintenance of all its products around the world. Three different CANDU reactors
are introduced (AECL, 2010a):
 CANDU 6 power reactors: The exclusive feature of the CANDU 6 is that it uses
natural uranium as fuel. This feature is very important, because the fuel can be
manufactured in the country. CANDU 6 is a 700 MWe nuclear power reactor, and is
developed only for electricity generation purposes.
 Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6): EC6 is the evolution of the CANDU 6 design.
 Advanced CANDU Reactors (ACR-1000): The Generation III+ is a 1,200
MWe Reactors and is more advanced than existing CANDU reactors, particularly in
regard to:
– Enhanced passive safety
– Competitive economics
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– Designed for operability and maintainability
Table 4.1 shows the locations of CANDUs around the world.
Table 4.1: CANDU Reactors around the world (AECL, 2010b)
Location Site Units
Quebec, Canada Gentilly 2 1
Ontario, Canada Darlington 4
Ontario, Canada Peckering 8
Ontario, Canada Bruce 8
New Brunswick, Canada Point Lepreau 1
Argentina Embalse 1
Romania Cernavoda 2
Republic of Korea Wolsong 4





Conflict Resolution of the Ontario
Nuclear Dispute
This chapter examines the current nuclear power dispute concerning the expansion of the
Darlington nuclear site in Ontario. The Ontario Government plans to install two new
nuclear units at the Darlington site, near Toronto. Three companies have bid for the
project, one of which is Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL). Formed in 1952, AECL is
the designer and the builder of almost all CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors
in Canada, such as those at the Darlington, Bruce, and Pickering sites. It also has foreign
customers, such as Romania and China. AECL is committed to supporting its Canadian
and international customers in all aspects of nuclear power technology management. The
name AECL has always been a part of the nuclear history of Canada, and it can be
considered a national investment (AECL (Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.), 2008). This
chapter analyzes the obstacles that can prevent AECL, as a federal Crown corporation,
from winning the bid and discusses the roles of the Federal and the Ontario governments
and other Canadian parties and groups regarding this national issue. This conflict is an
ongoing dispute, and the situation of the game changes as time progresses. Therefore,
an analysis was performed at two points in time, 2008 and 2010, in Sections 5.3 and 5.4,
respectively. However, first the conflict resolution methodology is described followed by an
overview of the nuclear conflict in Section 5.1.
5.1 Graph Model for Conflict Resolution Methodol-
ogy
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is the approach that is used to analyze
this conflict. The GMCR methodology was developed by Fang et al. (1993) based upon
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earlier work by Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Howard (1971). GMCR can be used to for-
mally investigate a conflict dealing with multiple decision makers with multiple options.
It is for this reason that this methodology has been chosen to be used in this research.
Other approaches to conflict resolution are described in the books edited by Hipel (2009a;
2009b) and references contained therein. GMCR constitutes a flexible approach to the
representation, analysis, and understanding of a strategic conflict. It also facilitates modi-
fications to the way in which the conflict is represented, encouraging sensitivity and what-if
analyses. This decision technology can be used to analyze disputes among different parties
with different options or decision choices, and different preferences or value systems.
GMCR is able to provide decision makers (DMs) with suggestions for reaching possible
resolutions. These suggestions might protect the interests of all parties involved. Figure 5.1
illustrates the way in which a conflict study is carried out in practice. GMCR, along with
its associated decision support system GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a,b; Hipel et al., 1997),
is used to model the conflict and analyze the current situation.
The most important part of applying the GMCR model to a real-world conflict is
the background investigation. Searching the news, talking to experts, and reading the
related published articles help the analyst have a proper understanding about a conflict
and develop a realistic model. Therefore, accurate and comprehensive information plays
a fundamental role. In fact, the whole “Modeling” section, as shown in Figure 5.1, as
well as the “Interpretation and Sensitivity” stage in the “Analysis” part, directly depend
on the analyst’s findings. In other words, the analyst determines the DMs, their options,
infeasible states, and relative preferences. The analyst’s decision about executing different
sensitivity analyses, and the interpretations and suggestions to actual DMs for an ongoing
conflict depend on the available data.
5.1.1 Decision Makers, Options, and States
To use the graph model methodology, one must first model the dispute in terms of the DMs.
A DM is a person or a group who plays a role in a conflict and has one or more decisions to
make, or alternatives to choose. A DM may also be named a player, actor, or stakeholder.
Besides the DMs and options, states should be defined. A state is any combination of
chosen options. For example, in a conflict with 2 DMs, and 2 options for each, (Y N, N
Y) is an indication of a state in which DM 1 chooses its first option, and DM 2 chooses its
second option. Obviously, some states cannot occur in reality. These states are considered
“infeasible” and have to be removed from the game. The four different types of infeasible
states are introduced as follows (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, p. 34-36):
 Type 1 These states are logically infeasible for a single DM. This type of infea-
sibility can be illustrated in the states in which a DM chooses two or more options
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Figure 5.1: Applying the Graph Model for conflict resolution (Fang et al., 1993)
69
that in reality cannot be chosen together. A DM’s mutually exclusive options are an
example of a logically infeasible state for a DM. For example, in the conflict that is
being discussed in this chapter, the Ontario Government, as a DM, cannot buy its
reactors both from AECL and a foreign company. Type 1 infeasible states are the
easiest and safest ones to remove.
 Type 2 States that are preferentially infeasible for a single player are Type
2 infeasible states. These are the strategies that the DM would not be expected
to choose in any circumstances. For example, if a DM must choose between the
available options, the state in which the DM does not choose any option is infeasible.
Removing this type of infeasible state simplifies the conflict model, but can cause
problem in some situations.
 Type 3 There is risk involved in removing this type of state. Type 3 infeasible states
are logically infeasible among two or more players. For example, assume that DM
A has an option to offer a service to DM B, and DM B has the option to accept the
service. In this case, it is not possible that DM B accepts the service if DM A does
not offer it. The risk of removing this type of state is that the meaning of the options
might be restricted. In the aforementioned example, the option to “accept the offer”
may have been intended to mean “indicate a willingness to accept.” Therefore, if
this type of state is removed, there is a risk that the analysis will end up with false
results.
 Type 4 The removal of type 4 states presents the greatest amount of risk. These
states are preferentially infeasible among two or more players. It is possible for
a type 4 state to be an eventual resolution to the conflict. These states should
be removed in situations where there are still too many states in the conflict after
eliminating the other three types of infeasible states. However, eliminating this type
of state may cause the analyst to obtain wrong equilibria.
The decision support system GMCR II has a user-friendly approach for obtaining in-
formation from an analyst, such as mutually exclusive options, for identifying infeasible
states. Subsequently, all of the infeasible states are removed by GMCR II from the game
model so that only feasible states are analyzed. If one is not sure whether or not certain
states are infeasible, sensitivity analyses can be carried out to ascertain how leaving the
states in the conflict model affect the strategic findings.
5.1.2 Relative Preferences and Static Analysis
After generating a complete set of feasible states, the analyst must determine the relative
preferences, in which states, for each DM, are ranked from most to least preferred, where
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Figure 5.2: The box to choose a method for defining relative preferences (Hipel et al., 1997;
Fang et al., 2003a,b)
ties are allowed. There are different methods that could be used in GMCR II in order to
define the relative preferences of each DM. Figure 5.2 shows the box which is used in the
software to choose the method.
As can be seen in the figure, a DM is selected, and then its relative preferences are
determined. Fed, ON, and AECL are the DMs in this example. There are three methods
that can be used. The Direct Ranking method may be combined with both the Option
Weighting and Option Prioritizing methods.
 In the Option Prioritizing method, the analyst will sort the important criteria and
concerns of each DM from most to least important. For example, the analyst can
indicate that the most important thing for a DM is that options 1 and 2 are chosen,
and after that it is important to the DM that options 3 or 2 are not chosen. The
states will then be sorted according to this option prioritization.
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Table 5.1: DMs, options, and states in a hypothetical conflict
Decision maker 1
1. a N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N
2. b N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N
3. c N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
Decision maker 2
4. d N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N
5. e N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y
State number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 In the Option Weighting method, the analyst has to assign a weights to each option
putting him/her self in the position of each DM. This method is not very common
since it is possible that the weights do not reflect the reality, yet they may directly
influence the output.
 The Direct Ranking is another can be used in combination with two. In this method,
the analyst directly sorts the states from most to least preferred. This method is
appropriate for small conflicts.
In the first analysis of the conflict under consideration, the Option Prioritizing method
is used, because the conflict is rather large (See Section 5.3). In the next analysis, how-
ever, since the conflict now has only a few states, the Direct Ranking method is used
(Section 5.4). It is worth noting that preferences for a DM depend on not only what
options he/she chooses, but also on what options the other DMs select. In other words,
relative preferences for each DM are the states, which are the combinations of all the DMs’
choices, that are ranked from most to least preferred for that specific DM.
Subsequently, according to a rich range of solution concepts describing how people or
organizations may behave under a conflict, a stability analysis of the conflict is carried out
to calculate the stable states for each DM. A state that is stable for all of the DMs in the
dispute is called an equilibrium, which suggests a possible resolution to the conflict. Before
explaining different concepts of stability, the term “reachable states” should be defined.
Each DM can move from one state to another one in which other DMs’ option choices do
not change. In order to explain this matter, an example is provided. In a hypothetical
conflict, Table 5.1 shows the DMs and their options and the states of the conflict, where
each state is a column of Ys and Ns.
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Table 5.2: Reachable states
State DM 1 DM 2
1 2, 3, 4 5, 9
2 1, 3, 4 6, 10
3 1, 2, 4 7, 11
4 1, 2, 3 8, 12
5 6, 7, 8 1, 9
6 5, 7, 8 2, 10
7 5, 6, 8 3, 11
8 5, 6, 7 4, 12
9 10, 11, 12 1, 5
10 9, 11, 12 2, 6
11 9, 10, 12 3, 7
12 9, 10, 11 4, 8
As can be seen in Table 5.1, DM 1 has 3 options: a, b, and c, and DM 2 has two
options: d and e. DM 1 can move from state 1 to 2, 3, and 4, since DM 2’s situation is the
same in all these states. Therefore, states 2, 3, and 4 are reachable states for DM 1from
state 1.
RDM1(1) = {2, 3, 4}
Table 5.2 shows the reachable states for each DM from every state. Another important
term is “unilateral move”, UM. When a DM moves from one state to another among the
corresponding reachable list, this move is called a unilateral move. If the state where the
DM moves to is more preferred by him/her, the move is called a “unilateral improvement”,
and the set of the possible UMs from state “k” by DM i is shown as1: R+i (k)
Four different types of stability may be used to analyze a conflict. These definitions
hold for GMCR as defined by Fang et al. (1993) while the references for the originator of
the stabilities are provided. In Table 5.3, the different types of stability are described and
compared. Note that in these definitions, N is the set of DMs in the game.
 Rational, “r”, or “R” (Nash, 1950, 1951): A state is rationally stable for a DM
when that DM does not have any unilateral improvements from that state. This type
is also called “Nash” and it could be shown by “n”. The mathematical definition is
also provided:
1Note that the “+” shows that the move is actually an improvement.
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A state k ∈ U is rationally or Nash stable for DM i ∈ N , if and only if: R+i (s) = ∅,
where N is the set of DMs, and U is the set of feasible states in the conflict.
 Sequentially Stable, “SEQ”, “s” (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, 1979): A state is
sequentially stable for a DM when all the unilateral improvements from that state
are sanctioned by another DM’s unilateral improvements in the game. For example,
if DM 1 unilaterally improves from state k to k1, and another DM improves from state
k1 to k2, and k2 is less preferred than k by DM 1, then DM 1 stays at k. Therefore,
this unilateral improvement is blocked. If all unilateral improvements from k are
sanctioned by others, the state is SEQ stable for DM 1, since this DM does not want
to move to a less preferred state.
A state “k” is sequentially stable for DM i ∈ N if and only if: For every k1 ∈ R+i (k),
there exists at least one k2 ∈ R+N−i(k1) such that Pi(k2) ≤ Pi(k).
 General Metarationality, “GMR” (Howard, 1971): A state is GMR stable for a
DM when all the unilateral improvements from that state are sanctioned by another
DM’s unilateral move in the game. For example, if DM 1 unilaterally improves from
state k to k1, and another DM moves from state k1 to k2, and k2 is less preferred
than k by DM 1, then DM 1 stays at k. If all unilateral improvements from state
k for DM 1 are bloched in this way, state k is stable for DM 1, since this DM does
not want to move to a less preferred state. In this type of stability, the DM is very
conservative, as it not only considers the other DMs’ improvements, but also all of
their moves. Therefore, in this concept, it is assumed that DMs may move to less
preferred states to harm others.
A state “k” is sequentially stable for DM i ∈ N if and only if: For every k1 ∈ R+i (k),
there exists at least one k2 ∈ RN−i(k1) such that Pi(k2) ≤ Pi(k),
where Pi(k2) ≤ Pi(k) means state k2 is less preferred than state k by DM i.
 Symmetric Metarationality, “SMR” (Howard, 1971): As in GMR, the DMs are
conservative in this concept, as they even consider the particular DM’s counter-moves
to attempt to escape from possible sanctions.
A state “k” is sequentially stable for DM i ∈ N if and only if: For every k1 ∈ R+i (k),
there exists at least one k2 ∈ RN−i(k1) such that Pi(k2) ≤ Pi(k) and for all k3 ∈ Ri(k2),
Pi(k3) ≤ Pi(k).
Figure 5.3 shows the mathematical relationships among the stability concepts (Fang
et al., 1993). As shown in the diagram, Nash stability is the subset of all the other
stabilities. It is also the strongest one, since in the model, the DM can not move unilaterally
to a more preferred state. GMR includes SEQ, SMR, and Nash. It is the weakest state, as is
the case in reality. In case studies presented in one of the GMCR reference books, “Conflict
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Table 5.3: Solution concepts and human behavior (Fang et al., 1993; Hipel et al., 1997)
Solution
Concept





Nash DM cannot move uni-
laterally to a more pre-
ferred state
Low Own Never Ignores risk





Medium All Never Takes some
risks
GMR All DM’s unilateral im-
provements are sanc-
tioned by subsequent
unilateral moves by oth-
ers
Medium Own By opponent Avoids risks
SMR All DM’s unilateral im-
provements are sanc-
tioned, even after re-
sponse by the DM
Medium Own By opponent Avoids risks
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Figure 5.3: Stability concepts in an n-player conflict (Fang et al., 1993)
Analysis, Models and Resolutions” (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), GMR and SMR stable states
are not the states that took place in reality and are not the equilibria. As explained above,
these concepts occur in special cases in which the players are very conservative and avoid
risks.
After carrying out a stability analysis, one may perform some sensitivity analyses. In
this case, the DMs, the options, or the relative preferences can be changed to obtain a better
understanding of the issue and ascertain how the equilibrium results are affected. There are
also other types of analyses that can be carried out within the GMCR framework including
attitudes (Inohara et al., 2007; Bernath-Walker et al., 2009), coalitions (Kilgour et al.,
2001; Inohara and Hipel, 2008a,b), strength of preference (Hamouda et al., 2004, 2006; Xu
et al., 2009a), misperceptions(called hypergames) (Wang et al., 1988), emotions (Obeidi
et al., 2005, 2006, 2009b,a), preference uncertainty (Li et al., 2004; Hipel et al., 2011),
conflict dynamics (Li et al., 2005), and matrix stability coalitions (Xu et al., 2009b).By
applying different analyses, the outcomes can be more deeply interpreted and insights may
be achieved.
The first analysis for this dispute was conducted for 2008 in Section 5.3. This issue is
an ongoing problem, and the conflict has not been resolved. After the first analysis, some
other related announcements and news items have been published. Therefore, a second
analysis was performed in 2010 as represented in Section 5.4, taking into consideration the
more recent information. Although the two analyses may involve similar DMs and options,
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they are different in terms of the relative preferences of the DMs.
Next section gives a thorough background of the conflict, providing documents that can
be helpful for finding preferences for each DM, followed by the two analyses at two different
points of time, 2008 and 2010 in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. In each analysis, the
DMs and their options are introduced. After the feasible and indistinguishable states are
determined, the relative preferences for each DM are defined. Then, the static analysis
and other dynamic analyses are performed.
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5.2 Introduction to the Conflict
Canada has twenty-two CANDU reactors; twenty of them are located in Ontario, the most
populous province, one in Quebec, and one in New Brunswick. Nuclear energy provides
about 15 percent of Canada’s electricity (AECL, 2008). Figure 5.4 illustrates the map of
the reactors’ locations and Uranium mines in Canada.
In the coming decades, the Liberal Government of Ontario wants nuclear plants to re-
main the source of half of Ontario’s electricity supply. It plans to install two new nuclear
reactors, which will provide up to 3,200 megawatts of electricity, to expand the Darlington
nuclear site to address the increasing demand for electricity and also to reduce Greenhouse
Gas (GHG) emissions. Although Dalton McGuinty, the Ontario Premier, in his election
campaign, had promised to shut down four coal-fired plants, which are highly polluting,
by 2007, in 2006, he decided to postpone this plan to 2014, because there was no proper
replacement energy producer (CBC News, 2006). At the beginning of March 2008, Energy
Minister Gerry Phillips officially announced that the provincial government wants to re-
ceive proposals to build a new nuclear plant. He declared that construction should begin
in 2012 and electricity should be generated by July 1, 2018 (Benzie and Black, 2008).Orga-
nizations that submitted their proposals included AECL, Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC,
an American company, and Areva, a French company (Frame, 2008).
As mentioned before, this conflict is analyzed with respect to two different points in
time. In the following section, the dispute is explained according to the analyst’s informa-
tion and available publications as of 2008. It is worth noting that the present time in this
section refers to the year 2008.
5.2.1 AECL’s Reputation
Some incidents have aggravated the position of AECL in this contract and may prevent the
Ontario Government from selecting this company as the builder of the new plant reactors.
1. The National Research Universal (NRU) Chalk River reactor is the only nuclear re-
actor in North America that supplies medical isotopes for molecular imaging, radio
therapeutics, and analytical instruments. On November 18, 2007, the Canadian Nu-
clear Safety Commission (CNSC) ordered the shutdown of the reactor, because it
found that AECL had been operating the reactor for 17 months without a back-up
emergency power system for cooling pumps, which prevent the reactor core from
melting down. In 2006, AECL was ordered by CNSC to upgrade the NRU by in-
stalling that system. After two weeks of shutdown, Michael Burns, the chairman
of AECL at the time, resigned and Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada,
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Figure 5.4: Map of Canadian reactors and Uranium mines (Canadian Nuclear Society,
2006)
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accepted his resignation and blamed the Liberal appointed Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission for the closure. He pushed an emergency measure through Parliament,
on December 12, 2007, but the Liberals opposed the measure. They feared that the
NRU is unsafe and requires more upgrades. Eventually, the reactor was restarted
in late January 2008, when Harper fired Linda Keen, the CNSC’s head, who was a
Liberal committee member. The outage created a critical and worldwide shortage
of the radioactive diagnostic material and is considered a serious negative point in
AECL’s history (CBC News, 2008; Spears, 2008; Nathwani, 2009).
2. On May 16, 2008, AECL abandoned its plans to complete Multipurpose Applied
Physics Lattice Experiment (MAPLE) reactors, which had started in 1996. These
reactors were to serve as a replacement for the NRU at Chalk River. In 2008, the
project was millions of dollars over budget and eight years behind schedule. The
failure of the MAPLE reactors is a dark point for AECL and has undermined its
reputation. As a result of the failure of this project, at the beginning of June 2008,
MDS Inc. launched a $1.6 billion lawsuit against AECL (Akin, 2008; Hamilton,
2008b). Moreover, in an expert panel report commissioned by Prime Minister Harper,
Goodhand et al. (2009) recommended that a completely new, and more flexible isotpe
reactor be constructed.
3. The third incident happened at the Bruce site, in June 2008. AECL was working
on the Bruce Power generating station to restart reactor units 1 and 2. This project
was originally estimated at $2.75 billion. By 2008, the costs were in the range of
$3.1 billion to $3.4 billion, and Ontario electricity consumers had been compelled
to pay for $237.5 million of budget overruns. In April 2008, TransCanada Pipelines
Ltd., a financial partner in the Bruce restart project, accused AECL of being the
main responsible party for the delay and added costs. The main issue was that
AECL misplaced a radioactive part while working on the plant and did not notify
officials at Bruce Power. After two months, in June, 2008, the missing part was
found accidentally by a worker. AECL accepted the responsibility. Spokesperson
Dale Coffin acknowledged it took too long for the company to alert officials. ”We’re
disappointed we didn’t notify Bruce Power sooner,” he said (Hamilton, 2008b).
4. The safety standards are another problem. After September 11, 2001, the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established guidelines that mandate reactor
builders to change the designs so that reactors have the ability to withstand a mas-
sive outside shock or explosion. These safety standards must be applied to all new
reactor designs. As AECL’s reactors do not meet these standards, new regulations
could be a major setback for AECL. Jerry Hopwood, vice-president of reactor devel-
opment at AECL, has accepted the design weaknesses and said: “We would design
a CANDU6, the advanced one, or adapt it, the old one, if needed, to meet the
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standards2(Hamilton, 2007).”
5.2.2 The Federal Government’s View towards AECL
In light of the problems pertaining to AECL, the Federal Government wants to enhance
its nuclear credibility. Gary Lunn, Natural Resources Minister at the time, said that it is
“imperative” that Ontario purchase new reactors from AECL (Geddes, 2007). Although
Harper’s government comprehends the importance of AECL as a federal Crown corpo-
ration, it does not completely support AECL’s efforts to regain its previous reputation.
Harper’s government declares that in order to help the electricity production or the im-
provement of the nuclear technology, the government has to decide about AECL’s current
status. The Conservatives are looking at different business models for AECL, including
the sale of ownership stocks to one of several companies that have expressed interest, such
as GE and France’s Areva, foreign companies, and Bruce Power Inc., a Canadian company.
Natural Resources Minister Lunn said that AECL’s status is under review: “All options
are on the table,” he said, ”from the status quo to a partnership with private investors to
a sale to a foreign government.” Another incentive for the Federal Government to change
the status of AECL is the reliance of AECL’s development program on federal tax dollars.
Regarding its budget overruns, the sale of its stocks to a private company could alleviate
taxpayers’ criticisms of the Federal Government. On the other hand, industry observers
say the lawsuit pertaining to the MAPLEreactors will make it more difficult for Ottawa
to find a private suitor for AECL. This increases the probability that the government will
opt to sell AECL to a foreign company or government (Hamilton, 2008b; Puxley, 2007).
5.2.3 The Federal Government vs. The Ontario Government
On the other side of the conflict, the Ontario Government is dealing with its own issues.
Premier McGuinty stated: “The Ontario Government is unwilling to purchase new reactors
from AECL unless it receives assurance that the Federal Government will remain the
ultimate backer of AECL”. The McGuinty government is concerned about AECL’s history
and made it clear that while it would prefer to buy home-grown technology, it is open to
purchasing from a foreign company if it means getting the best deal for Ontario’s taxpayers.
2After NRU restarted in January 2008 (Section 5.2.1), another shutdown happened in 2009. On May
14, 2009, NRU was shutdown due to a loss of electrical power in Ontario. On May 15, when the experts
were investigating the reactor, they observed a small leak of heavy water within the facility. Therefore,
the NRU was kept out of service for repair (AECL, 2009b). On August 17, 2010, the NRU was returned to
operation (NRU Canada, 2010). The performance of NRU, as an important supplier of medical isotopes
in the world, is critical, and the repeated shutdowns of this reactor diminished the reputation of AECL,
the company responsible for it.
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If Ottawa does not support AECL, it will be very hard for it to sell the reactors in Ontario,
and if it can not do so, it will face a difficult time selling them anywhere else in the
world (Hamilton, 2007).
In addition, timing and financial issues affect the Liberal government’s decision. McGuinty
promised to shut down all the province’s coal-powered plants by 2014. New nuclear plants
would be completed by 2018 if everything goes according to schedule. Furthermore, con-
struction of a nuclear plant requires huge investments and compels Ontario’s taxpayers to
bear a heavy tax burden. As mentioned before, taxpayers have already paid for the cost
overruns of the Bruce project. Therefore, the Ontario Government wants AECL to be
fully financially supported by the Federal Government. The provincial government is in
an urgent situation in terms of the need for new power generation. It is unable to wait a
very long time for AECL to prove its qualifications, but has to make its decision by March
2009 at the latest (Hamilton, 2008b; McParland, 2008).
5.2.4 Green Groups of Canada
The Green Party of Canada, along with other green organizations and environmental
groups, and the New Democratic Party (NDP) of Canada are on the other side of the
conflict. They have always opposed the use of nuclear energy and believe that the Federal
Government does not invest sufficiently in renewable energies. They think Canada has
enough clean energy resources and does not need nuclear plants. These groups do not
consider nuclear energy a clean energy, because there is still no proper means of nuclear
waste management. They express their disagreement through their websites, articles, and
speeches. Green Groups are also concerned about the costs and consider nuclear energy
generation to be expensive. In this dispute, Green Groups would agree with privatizing
or selling AECL. In this case, there is no need for the Federal Government to spend
much money on AECL’s funding, and taxpayers will not suffer. Besides, it is easier to
oppose AECL as a private nuclear organization when it does not have the government’s
support (New Democratic Party, 2008; Sierraclub, 2008; Harris, 2008).
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5.3 Analysis in 2008
5.3.1 The State of The Conflict in 2008
AECL is in trouble; in ten years (by 2008), it has not sold a single reactor. A new president
was appointed in December 2007 to change the situation and return it to its once leading
position in the nuclear industry. In the February federal budget, it received an appropria-
tion of $300 million to support research and develop new technology. However, AECL still
cannot convince the Ontario Government to buy its advanced reactors. A few key factors
can possibly change AECL’s situation; in June 2008, AECL announced that it had signed
an agreement with the Nuclear Power Institute of China to collaborate on the “design,
research, development, and demonstration” of “low uranium consumption CANDU tech-
nologies.” Moreover, AECL is working with South Korea on a process called “direct use of
spent pressurized water reactor fuel in CANDUs” (DUPIC). DUPIC is unique and can give
Canada the opportunity to solve many problems in a nuclear energy market increasingly
dominated by light-water reactors. DUPIC also gives existing and new CANDU6 reactors
a chance to minimize the environmental risks. As nuclear experts point out, the existence
of the DUPIC project alone gives the Federal Government a new option to give AECL
another chance. It could be a good standing point for the company. If AECL achieves
good results with these projects and keeps achieving satisfactory contracts, it might change
the Federal and provincial governments’ views (Hamilton, 2008a).
Different parties and groups in Canada are concerned about AECL’s future. “If they
[AECL officials] don’t get our order, AECL effectively becomes [just] a CANDU repair
shop,” said Ontario Energy Minister Duncan, adding that AECL would be worth far less
if Ottawa made moves to privatize it. If AECL is to be sold to a foreign country, thou-
sands of skilled workers will lose their jobs at a time that the province is already losing
thousands of industrial jobs. However, the political conflicts between the Federal and On-
tario Governments make the situation much more difficult. The Federal Government keeps
the negotiations and meetings in secret, and does not make clear its intentions regarding
AECL. Though it is assessing different options, it seems that the Federal Government
mostly prefers to sell AECL. In this case, the Federal Government’s financial problems on
account of AECL will be resolved, and there will be more opportunity for it to improve
technologically. However, AECL does not want to be privatized. Its spokesman, Dale Cof-
fin, disputed suggestions that AECL needs a strategic private-sector partner to compete in
the world. Furthermore, Van Adel, the CEO of AECL, expressed strong opposition to any
partnership between AECL and Areva, when rumors about a meeting between Areva and
Natural Resources Minister Lunn were spread in 2007. If Harper gives his full support and
proclaims full confidence in AECL, McGuinty has to recognize the importance of AECL.
Currently, no political leaders take into consideration what is the best interests of AECL.
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Table 5.4: DMs and options in 2008 analysis
DMs Options
Federal Government 1. Sell less than 50% of AECL’s stocks, and keep the control of it
2. Sell or privatize AECL
3. Fully support AECL
Ontario Government 4. Buy reactors from AECL
5. Buy reactors from a foreign company
AECL 6. Convince both governments that it is capable of fulfilling its mandates
Green Groups 7. Continue their protests against nuclear power
Ontario Energy Minister Gerry Phillips has stated matter-of-factly that “AECL won’t be
treated differently than any other company.” However, AECL should, in fact, be treated
differently (Frame, 2008; Hamilton, 2007; Puxley, 2007).
5.3.2 Decision Makers
According to the background of the conflict, the decision makers (DMs) of the dispute are
listed below:
 The Federal Government
 The Ontario Government
 AECL
 Green Groups
Hereinafter, DM 1, DM 2, DM 3, and DM 4 denote Federal Government of Canada,
Ontario Government, AECL, and Green Groups, respectively.
5.3.3 Options
Regarding the background and the current state of the conflict, the four aforementioned
decision makers and their options are shown in Table 5.4.
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In order to better represent and discriminate states, each state is defined as follows:
Si = ( x1 x2 x3︸ ︷︷ ︸
DM 1






), xj ∈ {N, Y }, j = 1, . . . , 7 (5.1)
where xj = Y indicates that the j-th option is chosen and xj = N indicates that it is not.
It is a large conflict, so GMCR II software developed by the Conflict Analysis Group in
the Department of Systems Design Engineering at the University of Waterloo (Fang et al.,
2003a,b; Hipel et al., 1997)was used to perform various types of analyses.
5.3.4 Static Analysis
In this section, states, infeasible states and then coalesce indistinguishable states are deter-
mined. Next, the relative preferences for each DM are introduced. Finally, the equilibria
of the conflict are found.
Infeasible States and Indistinguishable States
In this section, the infeasible states are determined. Some states are infeasible in reality.
These states must be eliminated from the analysis.
Regarding the four types of infeasible states mentioned in Section 5.1.1, Type 1 infea-
sibility is observed in this conflict, and after removing those states, 48 states remain.
 Type 1: The options of the Federal Government (DM 1) and the Ontario Govern-
ment (DM 2) are mutually exclusive. Therefore, considering the options mentioned
in Section 5.3.3, the states listed below should be removed:
– DM 1: (Y Y -, - -, -, -), (Y - Y, - -, -, -), and (- Y Y, - -, -, -)
– DM 2: (- - -, Y Y, -, -)
Preferences
In this section, based on the background study of the conflict, the preferences of the
three DMs are determined using the option prioritizing method (Section 5.1.2). Some
explanations are provided and used to form the relative preferences.
 The Federal Government is contemplating the future of AECL: To sell less than
50% of AECL, sell it all or privatize it, or support it. However, its negotiations are
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Figure 5.5: Input box to enter relative preferences for DM 1 in GMCR II
not clear to other parties and to the public. The Federal Government prefers AECL
reactors be sold to Ontario, so that AECL can gain credit to sell more reactors to
other countries. After the states presenting this situation, the Federal Government
next prefers the states in which neither the Federal nor the Ontario Government
takes any action. The Federal Government would prefer to sell AECL if it is faced
with complaints from taxpayers or the Ontario Government. The least favoured
states for this DM are the ones that represent the support of AECL by the Federal
Government. Table 5.5 demonstrates the specific way that state prioritization is
managed in GMCR II for DM 1. In this table, preference statements are listed from
most important at the top to least important at the bottom. The numbers in the
left column of Table 5.5 refer to the option numbers given in Table 5.4 where a
negative sign means that the option is not taken. Notice that the most important
preference for the Federal Government is not to fully support AECL by not taking
option 3 (denoted by -3). Figure 5.5 shows the related box in GMCR II in which
the preference statements for this DM are entered. Assuming transitive or ordinal
preferences, an algorithm can take the prioritized preference statements of the Federal
Government in Table 5.4 and rank the states from most to least preferred where
ties are allowed. Figure 5.5 is the related box in GMCR II, in which the analyst
defines the relative preferences. The content in this figure can be compared with the
explanations provided in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.5: The option prioritizing table for the Federal Government(DM 1)
Preference Statements Explanation
-3 The most important thing for the Federal Government is not
to support AECL, and not to invest more money into it.
2 Next, DM 1 prefers to privatize AECL.
-1 & -2 & -3 & 4 The Federal Government mostly prefers that Ontario buys the
reactors from AECL.
-1 & -2 & -3 & -4 & -5 It prefers that both governments take no action.
2 & 4 Next, it prefers to privatize AECL and prefers DM 2 to buy
its reactors from AECL.
1 & 4 Next, it would like to sell less than half of AECL’s stocks and
DM 2 to buy its reactors from AECL.
3 & 4 & -5 After that, it prefers the case that it supports AECL, and
DM 2 buys the reactors from AECL.
3 & -4 & -5 It would like the situation that it supports AECL, and DM 2
to wait.
-1 & -2 & -3 if 5 If DM 2 makes a foreign purchase, DM 1 prefers to do nothing.
6 Redesigning the reactors by AECL is the one of its least pri-
orities.
-7 AECL’s working on the DUPIC project is also of less impor-
tance for DM 1.
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Table 5.6: The option prioritizing table for the Ontario Government (DM 2)
Preference Statements Explanation
3 & 4 &6 The Ontario Government mostly prefers to buy the reactors
from AECL and AECL redesigns its reactors, and DM 1 sup-
ports the company.
3 & 4 Next, it prefers to buy the reactors from AECL, while it is
supported by DM 1, even if AECL can not satisfy this DM.
2 & 4 & 6 Next, it prefers the future of AECL to be determined, and by
the reactors from this company, when AECL is trusted.
-4 & -5 Next, it would like not to take any action.
5 if 1 If DM 1 sells less than half of the company, DM 2 prefers to
buy the reactors from a foreign company.
-7 The Green Groups protest is the least important option to
consider.
 The Ontario Government most prefers to select home-grown technology if AECL
is successful in the redesign process. In addition, it would prefer that the Federal
Government supports AECL. AECL being supported by DM 1 is much more impor-
tant to DM 2 than redesigning CANDU reactors. It expects the Federal Government
to support AECL in completing its projects and on schedule. Next, it prefers the fu-
ture of AECL to be determined, and by the reactors from this company, when AECL
is trusted. As the Ontario Government does not want to waste time, it would rather
purchase the reactors from a foreign company if the future of AECL is undetermined.
Table 5.6 lists the prioritized preference statements for the Ontario Government.
 AECL is trying to complete its projects in order not to be sold. The most desirable
states for AECL are the ones in which AECL is not sold. Among these states, it is
more especially preferable for AECL to be supported, and it is also very important for
AECL to sell its reactors to the Ontario Government. Table 5.7 lists the preference
statementsfor AECL.
 Green Groups (GG) are against nuclear energy. They declare their opposition via
speeches and websites. Table 5.8 contains the preference statements for this DM. the
specific way that state prioritization is managed in GMCR2 for DM 4.
88
Table 5.7: The option prioritizing table for AECL (DM 3)
Preference Statements Explanation
4 The most important factor for AECL is to be chosen by DM 2
in the bid.
3 Next, it wants to be supported by the Federal Government.
-1 & -2 & -3 After that, it prefers just not to be sold.
-2 Next, It prefers not to be sold or privatized.
-1 In the fifth level, it prefers not to be sold partially.
-5 The next important factor for this DM is that DM 2 does not
pick a foreighn company to buy the reactors.
6 Helping the two government to trust this company is its last
priority.
Table 5.8: The option prioritizing table for Green Groups (DM 4)
Preference Statements Explanation
7 Their first priority is to continue their protests.
-4 & -5 In the first level, they do not want the Ontario Government
to buy any reactors.
-3 Green Groups do not want DM 1 to support AECL and fund
its activities.
2 After that, they want the Federal Government to sell or pri-
vatize AECL.
1 Selling less than 50% of AECL by DM 1 is their next prefer-
able option.
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Figure 5.6: Equilibria of the nuclear conflict in 2008
Equilibrium Evaluation
The analytical equilibrium states are derived from running the static analysis in GMCR II,
and are shown in Figure 5.6. They are horizontally listed below:
 (N Y N, N N, N N, Y): state 27,
 (N Y N, N N, N Y, Y): state 39, and
 (N Y N, Y N, N Y, Y): states 43.
These states indicate what actually took place in reality. As shown in Figure 5.6,
state 43 is the most stable equilibrium state, as its stability type is Nash,R, and the DMs
cannot move unilaterally to a more preferred state from state 43. States 27 and 39 are
also equilibria in this conflict, GMR and SMR. What has happened in reality (as of 2010)
is that the Ontario Government chose AECL as the vendor of the reactors, and then the
Federal Government decided to attempt to privatize AECL. After this decision was made,
the Ontario Government postponed the purchase of the two reactors, because the future of
AECL was very uncertain. Therefore, the state that took place was state 43, but states 27
and 39, which can be presented as (N Y N, Y N, N -, Y), happened after state 43, where
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a dash means Y or N. Also, since states 27 and 39 are only GMR and SMR equilibria,
the stability of these states is not as strong as an SEQ equilibrium in which the sanctions
by other DMs against unilateral improvements by a focal DM can only be levied using
unilateral improvements.
5.3.5 Status Quo Analysis
To apply status quo analysis, the current state of the conflict has to be determined. Next,
the analyst investigates the way the conflict has evolved from its initial state in 2008. In the
current state of the conflict, DM 1 and DM 2 are not taking any action; DM 3 is working
on the DUPIC project and on the design of ACR reactors, and consequently, trying to
satisfy its customer, DM 2, and its owner, DM 1 (option 7), and DM 4 is protesting. This
set of options represents the status quo state 25 (N N N, N N, N, Y). In this case, the
game develops from state 25 (N N N, N N, N, Y), to states 43, 27, and 39. The evolution
of the conflict is shown in Table 5.9. in Each level, one DM can move the conflict from a
state to another. The arrows, along with an assigned DM shows that which DM is moving
the conflict.
Table 5.9: Evolution of the conflict
DM 1 Sell less than 50% of AECL N N N N N
Privatize AECL N N N
DM1−→ Y Y
Support AECL N N N N N
DM 2 Buy from AECL N N
DM2−→ Y Y DM2−→ N
Buy from a foreign company N N N N N
DM 3 Satisfy DM 1 and DM 2 N
DM3−→ Y Y Y -
DM 4 Protest Y Y Y Y Y
25 37 29 43 27&39
Although it is shown that the 2008 conflict will finish in states 27 and 39 (which is
what happened in reality), in Section 5.4 the author shows that in fact the conflict will
again move to state 43, and states 27 and 39 are the transition states in 2010 conflict. It
is worth noting that the number assigned to each state is not the same in the 2008 and
2010 conflicts.
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Figure 5.7: The equilibria of the 2008 conflict when DM 4 (Green Groups) is omitted from
the game.
5.3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to gain more insights, some sensitivity analyses have been run. Sensitivity analyses
can help the analyst to have a better understanding of the conflict and the static analysis.
For example, in this conflict, it seems that although the Green Groups, DM 4, have an
option to protest against the investment on and the use of nuclear energy, they are not as
powerful as the other three DMs. The main reason for this is that all the other DMs, in
contrast to DM 4, are in favour of nuclear energy. It seems logical that DM 4, being the
only anti-nuclear DM, does not have a considerable effect on the result of the conflict. To
see how much this anticipation is correct, DM 4 is omitted from the game, and another
static analysis is executed, and the equilibrium states are shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7 verifies the aforementioned expectation, as the indicated results are essen-
tially the same as the results shown in Figure 5.6. Option prioritization tables show that
the decision of DM 4 regarding whether to protest or not is among the least important
issues for all DMs except for DM 4. Therefore, the results show that DM 4 is not an
important and effective DM in this conflict and does not play an important role. In other
words, DM 4 cannot significantly influence the other DMs’ decisions regarding the future
of AECL.
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Figure 5.8: The equilibria of the 2008 conflict when AECL and Green Groups are omitted
from the game.
Another idea is to eliminate DM 3 as well. Although AECL’s attempt to obtain other
DMs’ trust can change the decision of those two DMs, it is possible that their decisions are
independent of AECL’s achievements. If this belief is true, AECL is not actually a DM in
the conflict, and only the governments are the main DMs. Therefore, the expectation is
that the two equilibria are: (N Y N, Y N), which would be equivalent to state 43, and (N
Y N, N N), which is the same as states 27 and 39. The related analysis results verify the
fact that AECL is not an influential DM. Figure 5.14 shows the results.
In order to more deeply investigate the effect of AECL as a DM on the results of the
modeling, the preferences of this DM are changed. If AECL is not significantly affecting the
game, changing its preferences should not change the equilibria regarding the future of this
company. This change is applied to the game with three DMs, in which DM 4 is omitted.
Different arrangements of AECL’s relative preferences are made at this level. The results
are shown in Figure 5.9. The interpretation is that the equilibria do not change, although
their types do. This difference can be observed by comparing Figure 5.9 to Figure 5.7.
Therefore, AECL, in fact, does not make a considerable impression on the two other DMs.
Finally, since only two DMs found to be influential in this conflict, the status quo table
is reproduced to show the evolution of this smaller conflict (Table 5.10.
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Figure 5.9: The equilibria of the 2008 conflict when all states are equally preferred by
AECL.
94
Table 5.10: Evolution of the 2-DM 2008 conflict
DM 1 Sell less than 50% of AECL N N N N
Privatize AECL N N
DM1−→ Y Y
Support AECL N N N N
DM 2 Buy from AECL N
DM2−→ Y Y DM2−→ N
Buy from a foreign company N N N N
1 5 7 3
5.4 Analysis in 2010
In Section 5.3, the Ontario nuclear dispute was analyzed for 2008. This dispute, however, is
an ongoing conflict in the province. Therefore, in the following sections, an attempt is made
to perform a new GMCR analysis of the same conflict, but with an updated background. In
addition, regarding energy issues in the province, the Government of Ontario has recently
published an updated energy report (Ontario Government, 2010).
5.4.1 Updated Background of the Conflict
To summarize the history of the conflict in 2010, and to update the background of the
dispute in 2008, the time line of the nuclear project is described as follows (Ontario Gov-
ernment, 2009a):
 Phase 1
– On March 7, 2008, the Ontario Government announced a two-phase competitive
procurement process to choose a preferred nuclear reactor vendor
– In April 2008, a series of Commercially Confidential Meetings were held with
potential vendors
– On May 9, 2008, Infrastructure Ontario announced that three vendors had sub-
mitted Phase 1 Proposal Submissions as required by the RFP (request for pro-
posal)
– On June 5, 2008, Infrastructure Ontario announced that all three vendors that
had submitted Phase 1 Proposal Submissions received ’satisfactory’ ratings and
would be invited to proceed to Phase 2 of the RFP
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 Phase 2
– On June 16, 2008, Infrastructure Ontario released Phase 2 of the Nuclear Pro-
curement Project RFP
At this stage, and in November 2008, the first analysis was performed.
– From July to December 2008, a series of bilateral confidential meetings took
place on aspects of design readiness and commercial aspects of the project
– On February 27, 2009, Infrastructure Ontario announced that all three respon-
dents submitted Phase 2 Proposal submissions
– On May 28, 2009, the Government of Canada announced that it was proceeding
with a restructuring of AECL
– On June 29, 2009, the Minister of Energy and Infrastructure announced that the
Nuclear Procurement Project RFP was being suspended due to concerns about
pricing and uncertainty regarding AECL’s future
About the Bid
The Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) published a decisive report in
November 2009. This report studies the nuclear industry in Ontario and briefly investigates
the expansion of the Darlington nuclear site, the most important nuclear project in Canada.
The report stated that by 2008, Ontario had planned to invest $40 billion to replace and
refurbish its nuclear generating capacity, and subsequently, in February 2009, bids to build
a new facility at Darlington were accepted by the province (Cadham, 2009).
The CANDU design, proposed by AECL, is proudly Canadian in that Team CANDU
represents the provider of the province’s existing installed nuclear facilities. The AECL
CANDU design met the requirements of Infrastructure Ontario among three vendors,
AECL, Areva Group and Westinghouse Electric Co., and the province selected AECL’s
technology as the winner. The Ontario bid process required the risk of cost overruns to
be calculated by potential vendors, and AECL was the only one of the three that met this
demand. Toshiba-owned Westinghouse Electric ignored this key aspect of the bid crite-
ria. This company chose to focus only on its reactor technology and relied on others for
construction and commissioning. On the other hand, Areva, in its bid, proposed its new
Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor (EPR). Areva suggested the idea that it would be more
beneficial for Canada to diversify its nuclear technology rather than rely on AECL and
CANDU reactors. Areva attempted to convince the province that by announcing their
company as the winner, Canada could have a larger stake in the worldwide nuclear revival.
Although up to 70 percent of ERP’s uranium source could be Canadian, Areva, as well
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as Westinghouse, failed to satisfy the important criterion of taking cost overruns into con-
sideration. In the final assessment, the Ontario Government was not convinced by either
company’s proposals (Cadham, 2009).
In July 2009, George Smitherman, the Energy Minister of Ontario, said that the govern-
ment wanted to negotiate with Ottawa to reduce the bidding price. Smitherman declared
that AECL’s bid was “billions” above what Ontario anticipated. Ontario Power Gen-
eration (OPG) had estimated the cost of the installation of the two Advanced CANDU
Reactors (ACRs) at $3,000 per kilowatt, compared to $10,800, the price offered by AECL.
One of the major reasons for the offer being this high is that the design of ACR is not yet
complete, but Ontario is disinclined to pay for the cost of the research and development
(R&D) process. On the other hand, before the offer was submitted by AECL, the Harper
government had told the company that its bidding price must cover all the costs of R&D,
and that AECL should not count on the future sales to put off the cost overruns. In case
the Federal Government decides to keep AECL as a federal Crown corporation and not sell
it, the government needs to ensure that the Ontario nuclear project is commercialized in
an attempt to preserve AECL’s value and to avoid federal taxpayers subsidizing Ontario
ratepayers (McCarthy and Howlett, 2009).
The AECL’s restructuring is currently under scrutiny. In 2007, the Federal Government
hired the National Bank to provide independent financial advice and to help find the
best way to carry out the mandates of AECL. The National Bank countered with some
solid recommendations. In their recommendations, it was suggested that AECL has two
concurrent mandates: commercial goals involving the selling and servicing of reactors,
and R&D with regards to projects and technology. The bank advised that at least 51%
of AECL be sold and encouraged the Government of Ottawa to improve AECL’s place
in the international market. Natural Resources Canada published a report in May 2009
to present the ideas they received from National Bank and other consultants (Natural
Resources Canada, 2009e). AECL’s failure in handling its projects shows that in the
past, the two opposing mandates have not worked well together, and AECL has fallen
short on many of its objectives. Some of AECL’s unsuccessful projects were mentioned
in Section 5.2. The former Minister of Natural Resources, Lisa Raitt, advised: “The best
chance to take advantage of this nuclear renaissance is to divide the two of them and seek
global participation.” Raitt suggested that the designing and building of reactors is very
expensive, and Canadian tax payers cannot shoulder this burden on their own, so AECL
needs a strategic alliance in order to compete in the world (CTV, 2009). As stated in the
project procurement, the Government of Canada announced the restructuring of AECL in
May 2009. It also hired N.M. Rothschild & Sons to provide financial advice and available
options and received their financial analysis on the restructuring plan of AECL in October
2009, but the report is confidential due to commercial confidentiality considerations.
As stated by Lisa Raitt, the company’s research-and-development division, Chalk River
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laboratories, will continue to be government-owned, but with private-sector management (CBC
News, 2009a). The reactor business and its attractive maintenance and refurbishment ac-
tivities would then be offered for sale on either a majority or minority ownership. Some
parties accuse the government of wanting to sell AECL in order to balance its budget
deficit. According to the former Minister of Natural Resources, however, “this decision is
purely about bolstering the industry and getting it ready for future prosperity.” However,
this reconstruction is not desired by the Ontario Government as stated by Smitherman:
“The government of Canada needs to do the work that they are doing now to clarify the
future ownership of AECL, and when they have clarified that, to sharpen their pencils
substantially so that the people of the province of Ontario can renew their nuclear fleet
with two new units from that company (McCarthy and Howlett, 2009).”
Having discussed the points of view of the two governments, it can be concluded that
Ontario will not move until Ottawa clarifies the AECL’s ownership status. The other key
issue is AECL’s bidding price. Therefore, the uncertain future of AECL and the high price
were two important factors that led Ontario to postpone the project.
According to the background information, it is clear that Ontario mostly prefers to
buy the reactors from AECL. In fact, the province has rejected the foreign companies’
proposals. The province, however, does not accept AECL’s bidding price. Therefore, it
prefers to postpone the contract.
The government of Canada, on the other hand, can decide between several options:
privatizing and restructuring AECL, selling it to a Canadian or a foreign corporation, or
keeping it public and consequently helping AECL to decrease the price. It has been a
long time since the announcement of selling AECL, but it has not yet happened. There-
fore, there is still the possibility that the government will not privatize the federal Crown
corporation. Industry insiders say that the companies that are interested in partnership
with AECL are an international company, US-based Westinghouse Electric Co., Canadian
engineering giant SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., and Bruce Power, a Canadian-owned consor-
tium that operates a nuclear station in Ontario. The bidding process closed on June 30,
2010 (The Globe and Mail, 2010). Sources close to negotiations say that only SNC-Lavalin
Group Inc. and Bruce Power have submitted their bids to partner AECL (McCarthy,
2010).
Since there is opposition against selling or privatizing AECL, this decision is not an easy
one for the government to undertake (The Star, 2009). AECL possesses an internationally
competitive reactor design and thousands of Canadian employees, and AECL’s supporters
argue that it is not beneficial for the governments to let this company be sold. Canadian
nuclear analyst David Jackson says that the problem with dividing AECL into two parts,
and privatizing one of them is that “no potential purchaser would want to buy an ACR with
no assured R&D backup and thus, in effect the restructuring is the end of ACR” (Cadham,
2009). On the other hand, the Federal Government’s supporters believe that selling AECL
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is a sound decision as this company has been a burden on taxpayers for a long time, while
not being efficient enough. In addition, they think selling to a foreign company would
be a much better decision. A domestic sale will not change the pressure on taxpayers.
Furthermore, selling AECL to a domestic buyer will not help the company to regain its
reputation and competitive figure in the international market (McCarthy, 2010).
There are also other provinces, such as New Brunswick and Saskatchewan, that have
indicated an interest in buying new reactors. In July 2010, however, New Brunswick an-
nounced that it would not choose AECL as the provider of its reactors, and instead is
turning to Areva Group, which is a company that was interested in buying AECL, but
dropped out from the bidding. This decision, along with what happened in the Ontario
contract, are considered major setbacks for AECL, and complicate the decision of the
Federal Government regarding selling off AECL (The Globe and Mail, 2010). AECL was
counting on the Darlington project to galvanize its huge resources to launch its new Ad-
vanced CANDU Reactor (ACR). Therefore, in the end, if Ontario, as the largest customer,
decides not to buy any reactor at all, it would be unlikely that other provinces would
consider AECL’s unproven, first-of-its-kind ACR technology as a serious option.
The problem gets more complicated when we consider the massive amount of money
that Ontario has spent on its nuclear industry, which totals more than of all other provinces
and countries combined. Moreover, AECL has about 5000 employees, and privatizing it
will lead to a large number of job losses, which is not desired by any of the DMs or the
political parties in the country (McCarthy and Howlett, 2009).
5.4.2 Decision Makers, Options, States and Preferences
In the 2010 analysis, there are only two DMs, the Federal and Ontario Governments. Ac-
cording to the updated background, neither AECL nor the Green Groups are the main
DMs. (This matte was investigated in the sensitivity analyses in Section 5.3.6). Con-
sequently, their decisions do not affect the final decision that the Ottawa and Ontario
Governments will make. As aptly described in the CIGI report, “This [situation] leaves
the Federal and Ontario governments engaged in something of a dance of veil (Cadham,
2009).” In other words, since it is the responsibility of the Federal Government to finan-
cially support AECL, if this government does not provide enough budget for the company,
the possibility that AECL can compete with its foreign rivals and win the contract be-
comes very low. Another DM that can seriously affect the outcome of the conflict, and
the future of AECL is, obviously, the Ontario Government. Although AECL’s suggested
bidding price is very high, if the Ontario Government accepts to pay the price to expand
its nuclear site, it is possible that AECL could remain as a public company. Regarding
the DUPIC project, which AECL is working on, the published news and interviews of the
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Table 5.11: DMs and options in 2010 analysis
DMs Options
Federal Government 1. Sell AECL (to a foreign company)
2. Sell AECL (to a Canadian company)
3. Support AECL
Ontario Government 4. Buy from a foreign company
5. Buy from AECL
Table 5.12: DMs and options in 2008 analysis
DMs Options
Federal Government 1. Sell less than 50% of AECL’s stocks, and keep the control of it
2. Sell or privatize AECL
3. Fully support AECL
Ontario Government 4. Buy from AECL
5. Buy from a foreign company
officials of the two governments do not indicate that they pay much attention to the per-
formance of AECL on this project. They are more concerned about its progress in building
and selling reactors. Therefore, in the 2010 analysis, there are only two main DMs, the
Federal Government and the Ontario Government.
Regarding the options for the two governments, Table 5.11 shows the options for each
DM. As can be seen, the options for each DM change with respect to the previous analysis
in 2008, shown in Table 5.12.
In the most recent (2010) analysis, the first two options of the Federal Government
change from what they were in 2008, since in 2010, it is determined that if the Federal
Government decides to restructure AECL, it will privatize it, and not sell only less than
half of its stocks. The options, however, are selling to a local or an international organi-
zation. The reason for this is that, in practice, the Federal Government is studying the
privatization of one part, R&D, and selling the other part, CANDU. The Ontario Gov-
ernment, likewise, had more options in 2008. However, after examining the vendors’ bids,
the province recognized that if the final decision is to buy new reactors, the vendor would
definitely be AECL, so its second option would be eliminated, and the province will not
purchase reactors from a foreign company. Taking into consideration the latest announce-
ments and the updated background, as well as the options, the relative preferences of the
100
Table 5.13: List of feasible states
DM 1
1. Sell AECL (to a foreign company) N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N
2. Sell AECL (to a Canadian company) N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N
3. Support AECL N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
DM 2
4. Buy reactors from abroad N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N
5. Buy reactors from AECL N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y
State number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
DMs will also change.
Regarding the feasible states, the options for the two DMs are mutually exclusive. The
Federal Government cannot privatize and support AECL at the same time. Similarly,
the Ontario Government cannot choose its two options simultaneously. Therefore, the
following states, which are the type 1 infeasible states, are removed from the game, and 12
feasible states remain, which are shown in Table 5.13.
 DM 1: (Y Y -, - -), (Y - Y, - -), (- Y Y, - -)
 DM 2: (- - -, Y Y)
Rather than using option prioritization to determine the relative preferences of the
second DM, as was done in the previous analysis, direct ranking is employed. As stated
in Section 5.3.4, this method is also used in GMCR II to define the preference vector of a
DM. In this method, the analyst directly sorts the states from the most to least preferred.
Using this method is obviously feasible for small conflicts, so it performs well in this small
12-state conflict. Figure 5.10 and 5.11show the screens that are used to directly define the
preference vectors for the Federal and Ontario governments, respectively.
5.4.3 Static Analysis
After defining the DMs, their options and preferences, the static analysis is performed to
investigate the final possible outcomes. States 1 and 10 are found to be the equilibria
of the conflict. Figure 5.15 shows the related equilibrium box in the GMCR II software.
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Figure 5.10: Direct ranking box in GMCR II for the Federal Government
Figure 5.11: Direct ranking box in GMCR II for the Ontario Government
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Figure 5.12: The equilibria for SEQ and Nash stability of the static analysis in 2010
It is worth noting that in order to find the equilibria, Sequential and Nash stability are
considered. If one wants to analyze the GMR or SMR stabilities, Figure 5.13 should be
discussed.
As can be seen in Figure 5.13, aside from states 1 and 10, states 2, 3, 6, and 11 are
also the equilibrium states. In other words, if GMR and SMR stability concepts, where
the DMs are assumed to be conservative, are involved, 6 out of the 12 states of the conflict
are found as the equilibria of the game. This result shows that by DMs being conservative,
more states are stable, and the uncertainty of the game rises. The reason for this is that
if the DMs refrain from moving to different states on account of the possibility of losing
benefits, the conflict will stop in more states states and there will be more equilibria,
compared with the situation in which the DMs accept the risks and move from one state
to another.
However, in this specific conflict the DMs are not conservative. As an example, more
than a year ago, the Federal Government announced the restructuring AECL, but it has
not yet sold it. In addition, Ontario Government announced AECL to be the best company,
but postponed its decision about buying reactors from it. These examples show that the
DMs do accept some risks and do move from state to state. Therefore, GMR and SMR
stability concepts are ignored, and SEQ and Nash stability are being considered.
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Figure 5.13: The equilibria of the static analysis in 2010
Since this conflict is not very big, the static analysis can also be performed by hand
without the software. The reachable list is shown in Table 5.14.In Table 5.15, where the
term “PV” means preference vector, the unilateral improvements (defined in Section 5.1.2)
are indicated under each state for each DM. According to the definitions provided in
Section 5.1.2 regarding stability concepts, Nash and SEQ equilibria are found and shown
in Table 5.15.
State 1, where no DM takes any action, is one of the equilibria. This is a reasonable
solution, as it has been about 16 months since any of the governments have taken any
action. Although the Federal Government has announced the restructuring, it has not yet
introduced the purchaser. The Ontario Government, on the other hand, has postponed its
plan. Therefore, state 1 is an equilibrium, which is currently being played out. State 10
(Y N N, N Y) is another equilibrium.
In order to compare the equilibria of 2008 and 2010 analyses, Figures 5.14 and 5.15 are
displayed together. State 10 is a very strong equilibria since it is Nash stable. This state
is somehow similar to state 7 in the 2008 analysis. State 7 is also Nash stable and is a
stronger equilibria than state 3. Therefore, the relationship between the results of the two
conflicts can be listed below:
 State one is the initial state of both conflicts.
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Table 5.14: Reachable states
State DM 1 DM 2
1 2, 3, 4 5, 9
2 1, 3, 4 6, 10
3 1, 2, 4 7, 11
4 1, 2, 3 8, 12
5 6, 7, 8 1, 9
6 5, 7, 8 2, 10
7 5, 6, 8 3, 11
8 5, 6, 7 4, 12
9 10, 11, 12 1, 5
10 9, 11, 12 2, 6
11 9, 10, 12 3, 7
12 9, 10, 11 4, 8
Table 5.15: Stability analysis (e11=e22= +, eij= 0, i6=j)
Overall Equilibria E × × × × E × × × × × ×
Individual Stability r u u r s s s r u u u u
DM 1 PV 10 11 9 2 3 1 6 7 5 12 4 8
10 11 2 3 6 7 9 1 5
10 2 6 11 2 6
10 3 7
Individual Stability r r r r s u u u u u u u
DM 2 PV 12 1 11 10 5 7 6 3 2 4 8 9
1 11 10 7 6 12 4 1
11 10 12 5
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Figure 5.14: The equilibria of the 2008 conflict when AECL and Green Groups are omitted
from the game.
 State 2 (which is similat to 3 in the 2-DM 2008 analysis) is a transition equilibria in
2010 conflict and the equilibria of 2008 conflict.
 State 7 or 10 are the strong equilibria in both conflicts.
Now the question is that why is not state 7 the finishing point of the 2008 analysis? The
answer is that state 7 (or 10) are actually the equilibria, but state 3 is a very considerable
transition state. This nuclear conflict is very complicated since the DMs have changed
their decisions for several times. That is why the conflict moved from state 7 to 3 in 2008
conflict.
5.4.4 Status Quo Analysis
To investigate how the conflict evolves and moves from its 2008 state, state 1, to state
10, status quo analysis is performed. The evolution of the conflict is shown in Table 5.16.
Normally, the conflicts evolve as presented in Table 5.9; one DM moves the conflict from
one state to another, then another DM moves. In addition, it is not common for the
conflicts return to a previous state. However, in this specific conflict it is possible for a
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Figure 5.15: The equilibria for SEQ and Nash stability of the static analysis in 2010
DM to move the game in two back-to-back states. For example, both the prediction and
the reality are that DM 1 moves the conflict from state 2 to 1. As mentioned before, this
game is complicated since the DMs can change their decisions, and this feature makes this
game special.
state 2, which is equivalent to state 3 in the 2-DM 2008 conflict, is a transition state.
This state is the ending point of the 2008 conflict, but can be considered as a starting point
of the 2010 conflict. In order to easily compare the evolutions of 2008 and 2010 conflicts, the
status quo table of the 2-DM 2008 conflict is also illustrated here again ( 5.17). Although
the initial state is shown to be state 1 in Table 5.16, this state is actually the very first
point of the conflict in 2008. Therefore, state 1 is the initial state if the 2008 conflict, and
state 2 is its ending and also the beginning of the 2010 conflict. Finally, state 10 is the
equilibria in the 2010 game. The main reason for the difference between the two stages of
the conflict is the available information. One may see how the accuracy of information can
affect the result of a same conflict in two stages of time.
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Table 5.16: Evolution of the 2010 conflict
Federal
Gov.
1. Sell AECL to a for-
eign company
N N
DM1−→ Y Y DM1−→ N DM1−→ Y Y
2. Sell AECL to a
Canadian company
N N N N N N N
3. Support AECL N N N N N N N
Ontario
Gov.
4. Buy from a foreign
company
N N N N N N N
5. Buy from AECL N
DM2−→ Y Y DM2−→ N N N DM2−→ Y
1 9 10 2 1 2 10
Table 5.17: Evolution of the 2-DM 2008 conflict
DM 1 Sell less than 50% of AECL N N N N
Privatize AECL N N
DM1−→ Y Y
Support AECL N N N N
DM 2 Buy from AECL N
DM2−→ Y Y DM2−→ N
Buy from a foreign company N N N N
1 5 7 3
5.4.5 Attitude Analysis
Attitude analysis (Inohara et al., 2007; Bernath-Walker et al., 2009) is another analysis that
is performed on this conflict. In the original form of static analysis, each DM is considered
to have a positive attitude towards him/herself, and to be neutral towards other DMs. This
means that each DM does not carry out an action that harms him/herself, but may move
to a state that harms or benefits other DMs. The way DMs’ attitudes can be shown is
indicated in Table 5.18. The symbol eij ∈ {−, 0,+}, i, j = 1, . . . , n where n is the number of
players, denotes the attitude of player i towards player j. eij = −, eij = 0, eij = + indicate
negative, neutral, and positive attitudes towards the opponent, respectively. Table 5.18
demonstrates the method that DMs’ attitudes can be presented. Table 5.19 shows the
attitudes of players in the original form of static analysis.
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Table 5.18: Tabular representation of attitudes in a 2-DM game
DM 1 DM 2
DM 1 e11 e12
DM 2 e21 e22
Table 5.19: Attitudes in a regular 2-DM game analysis
DM 1 DM 2
DM 1 + 0
DM 2 0 +
It is worth noting that the analysis that is shown in Table 5.15 is performed by tak-
ing into consideration the attitude set indicated in Table 5.19. However, another set of
attitudes may be assumed in this game. Two different governments are the DMs in this
conflict. The Federal Government is run by the Conservative Party of Canada, and the
Ontario Government is run by the Liberal Party. Therefore, aside from the situation of the
Ontario contract and the future of AECL, the game involves the political conflicts between
these two politically opposed DMs. According to the background of the conflict, after
the Ontario Government announced that it favoured AECL’s proposal, the government
of Canada announced the restructuring of the company. The implementation of a new
nuclear station in Ontario is a vital requirement for the province. However, although the
Federal Government is keen on being a pioneer in nuclear technology, it seems that it does
not have a plan to help Ontario in this matter, and this may be the reason for the political
conflicts. Therefore, a new attitude arrangement (Table 5.20) is considered, and a new
static analysis is performed (Table 5.21). According to the attitudes in Table 5.20, from
each state, DM 1 can move to a state among the reachable states that is less preferred by
DM 2 and more preferred by itself. DM 2 can move to the states that are more preferred
by itself, ignoring DM 1’s preference. The corresponding unilateral moves to each state
are indicated under each state in the preference vector (PV) of each DM in Table 5.21.
With the new set of attitudes, two states are found as the equilibria of the conflict,
states 4 and 10. State 10 represents the situation in which DM 1 sells AECL to a foreign
company, and DM 2 buys the reactors from AECL. State 4 is a state in which the Federal
Government supports AECL, and the Ontario Government decides not to buy any new
109
Table 5.20: Attitudes in the new analysis
DM 1 DM 2
DM 1 + 0
DM 2 - +
Table 5.21: Stability analysis (e11=e22= +, e12= -, e21= 0)
Overall Equilibria E × × × × × × × × × E ×
Individual Stability r u r r s u r u u u r r
DM 1 PV 10 11 9 2 3 1 6 7 5 12 4 8
10 2 3 6 7 9
2 6 11
10
Individual Stability r r r r s u u u u r u u
DM 2 PV 12 1 11 10 5 7 6 3 2 4 8 9
1 11 10 7 6 12 4 1
11 10 12 5
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reactor. The results show that if, in reality, the Federal Government does have a plan to
harm the provincial government, and at the same time, benefit itself, it is possible that
the final outcome of the game is state 4, which is among the least preferred states for both
DMs.
5.5 Summary
The dispute over the expansion of the Darlington nuclear site in Ontario is modeled in
this chapter. The history of the conflict goes back to March 2008. The dispute has been
analyzed and modeled with respect to two different points of time, fall 2008 and spring
2010. According to the background of the game in 2008, four DMs were considered to be
involved in the game, the Federal and Ontario governments, AECL, and Green Groups.
However, after several sensitivity analyses, the author arrived at the conclusion that the
main DMs only include the Federal and Ontario governments. The status quo analysis is
also provided and the evolution of the conflict from March to fall 2008 is explained. It is
found that the spirit of the conflict is about the doubt of DMs in making certain decisions.
Sometimes, even DMs change their decisions, or at least announce different or opposite
points of views. Therefore, some of the equilibria of the 2008 analysis are found to be the
transition states in 2010 analysis. The conflict did not terminate at this point and is still
ongoing. The results and information of the analysis in 2008, and an updated background
in 2010 are used to perform another analysis in 2010. Only the two governments are
counted as the players this time. Meanwhile, their options have also been changed. The
stable states of the game are found, and attitude analysis is carried out to obtain deeper
insights about the dispute. It is discovered that if the Federal Government does have a
negative attitude towards the Ontario Government, it is possible that the final outcome is
a state that is among the least preferred states for both DMs.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis studies the energy situation and electricity generation in Canada. Each energy
source is briefly explained, and its role in energy production is examined. By means of
CanESS, the author was able to provide a future perspective about the energy issue. The
focus of the study is the province of Ontario. Therefore, some simulations were performed
by using CanESS with regards to this province. Since nuclear energy is the most significant
source of energy in Ontario, this type of energy was studied in detail. There is a conflict
between the Federal and provincial governments with regard to nuclear energy. GMCR II
was used to analyze and model this conflict, since this dispute involves multiple decision
makers with multiple options.
Since the conflict began in 2007 and has not yet been resolved, two analyses were
performed at two different points of time, in 2008 and 2010. In fact, by having the results
of the simulations in 2008, the analyst obtains more confidence in the results of the more
recent analysis. The outputs of the analysis in 2008 are the transition states in the 2010
analysis and are depicted in the status quo analysis.
In summary, the two GMCR analyses along with the data series provided by CanESS
and the simulations that were run by this software were presented to assist analysts in the
field of energy strategy and especially the ones who are involved in the current nuclear
conflict of Ontario.
6.1 Contributions of Thesis
The major contributions of this thesis are as follows:
 The examination of different energy sources in Canada presents a perspective about
energy infrastructure in this country. Because the focus of the research is energy in
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Ontario and nuclear energy is more significant than the other energy sources, this
type of energy is investigated more deeply in the thesis. A brief history of nuclear
energy is provided in Chapter 4 and the role of Canada has been described in this
regard.
 CanESS, which is an energy systems simulator tool, is presented and introduced
in Chapter 3. CanESS provides a large of Canadian energy. In addition to being
a database, CanESS contains a very large energy modeling platform. Thousands of
parameters, factors, and mathematical formulations are playing roles in this platform
in order to define different energy-related scenarios and analyze the issues of interest
with a “what if” method.
 The Ontario nuclear dispute which has been taking place between the two Federal
and provincial governments is modeled and investigated in this thesis. Since multiple
decision makers are involved in this conflict and each of them has multiple alterna-
tives, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is the chosen methodology to study
the conflict. The results will assist stakeholders and policy makers involved in this
issue.
6.2 Future Work
This thesis has studied the role of different energy sources in Canada. It then focuses on
nuclear energy in Ontario. To determine an overall energy policy, every source of energy
should be investigated in more detail, and the associated technological issues should also
be examined. In addition, several energy related conflicts are taking place in the country.
GMCR possesses great potential to model the games involving multiple decision makers
and options. Therefore, GMCR is highly recommended to investigate strategic energy
disputes.
With regard to the Ontario nuclear conflict, more sensitivity analyses can be performed.
Furthermore, other methods of option prioritization may be utilized to define relative
preferences. Moreover, since this dispute has not yet been resolved, further analyses should
be done with updated information in the future.
Energy regulations are also very important in policy and strategy making processes.
To investigate the obstacles that prevent the Federal and provincial governments from
cooperating and thereby making progress towards Canada becoming an energy superpower,
energy policies and regulations should be suitably analyzed. The regulatory study will be
beneficial to assist stakeholders and policy makers in the decision making processes.
Finally, in all national decision making processes, cost and benefit studies are manda-
tory, and energy conflicts are not an exception. Whatever decision a government makes, it
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should be economically sound. Therefore, it is suggested that before modeling a conflict by
GMCR, cost analyses be performed. In this way, if an alternative is not cost-efficient for
a decision maker, a coalition of decision makers, or for all of the decision makers, different
approaches can be chosen to model and resolve the conflict. This suggestion may also be
followed for the continuing dispute over nuclear energy in Ontario and elsewhere.
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Three main types of hydroelectricity producing technologies are available (Canadian Hy-
dropower Association, 2008):
 Run-of-River: The plants producing electricity by this technology are located close
to rivers. Turbines are placed in the river’s flow and produce electricity immediately
using a river’s water flow. Therefore, the amount of electricity produced varies ac-
cording to the flow. Canada has several large run-of-river facilities, such as the 1,600
MW Sir Adam Beck 1 on the Niagara River in Ontario. Several small run-of-river
facilities have also been developed as part of a bigger generation facility, such as the
1,436-megawatt La Grande-1 on James Bay, and many smaller run-of-river plants,
like Waterton in Alberta.
 Storage: A storage facility includes a reservoir. This type of facility generally
produces more energy than a run-of-river project of the same size, because in this
technology, water is saved when it is plentiful, and its power is used in periods when
electricity is scarce. Because hydropower maintains the balance between electricity
supply and demand, a storage facility can support the development of other renewable
but intermittent sources such as wind and solar.
 Pumped Storage: In this technology, excess electrical energy (for example, energy
generated at night) is used to pump water uphill to a storage reservoir. At other times
when energy is needed, the water is released and converted back into electricity in
the hydro station. In Canada, there is one pumped storage facility, the 174-megawatt
Sir Adam Beck Pump Generating Station at Niagara Falls in Ontario.
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